The semi-submersible drilling platform Development Driller I was anchored in Grand Isle Block 91 off Louisiana, US, but had never performed drilling services because its cracked, submerged thruster housings were damaged and undergoing repair. As Hurricane Katrina approached, the vessel was evacuated on 27 August 2005. The vessel's power was shut off and the crew flown to shore. The vessel was severely listing, out of position, and dragging its anchor. On 30 August 2005, on the defendants' request, some crew members, including the plaintiffs, Louis Solana and Brendan J Lally, returned to the vessel. Emergency power was established and the main power was essentially restored, although there were repeated blackouts. However, flooding was progressing and the situation was worsening. The crew was gradually able to improve the vessel's trim and counteract flooding. They advised the defendants of the extent of damage. The defendants engaged a professional salvage firm. The plaintiffs worked with the professional crew for the next few days, until 5 September 2005, when the platform was stabilised.

Louis Solana held the position of offshore installation manager, which was the equivalent of the vessel's captain. The parties disputed whether he maintained a 21-days-on, 21-days-off schedule while assigned to the vessel, but they agreed that his service had been performed on at least a somewhat similar basis. He was in the midst of his time off when the vessel was evacuated, but the parties agreed that he had intended to return to the vessel on 31 August 2005 as the captain of its crew. Brendan J Lally served on the vessel as a senior dynamic positioning operator and ballast control operator and was evacuated from the vessel as Katrina was approaching it. The plaintiffs had not signed the vessel's articles. They were at-will employees. They were compensated for time spent aboard the vessel but not for their time ashore.

The plaintiffs commenced an action, alleging they were entitled to recover, as pure salvors, a salvage award of at least 10 per cent of the value of the vessel. The defendants moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The defendants asserted that crew members were not entitled to a salvage award for assistance rendered to their own vessel and that, though there were exceptions to this principle, the plaintiffs did not come within them. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that they were volunteers when they returned to the vessel. They also argued that they were entitled to recover as salvors under art 17 of the Salvage Convention 1989 because there were no employment contracts in effect when they returned to the vessel following Katrina. Alternatively, if there was a contract, the Court should consider whether the services they rendered exceeded their normal duties and would entitle them to a salvage award. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment, concluding that the undisputed facts established an oral contract and that the plaintiff expected to be paid even if their efforts were unsuccessful. The Court did not mention the Convention.

The plaintiffs appealed. Their primary contention on appeal was that their claims were governed by the Convention. The defendants countered by arguing that the Convention was not self-executing, had not been implemented in its entirety by enabling legislation, and that the US had not implemented it to apply to offshore drilling platforms or units. Alternatively, art 3 of the Convention excluded vessels such as the Development Driller I.

Held: Summary judgment reversed. Action remanded for further proceedings.

In this case, the result was the same irrespective of whether the general maritime law or the Convention determined whether a salvage award was owed. Therefore, it was not determined whether the general maritime law in this area survived the Convention.

Articles 6.1 and 17 of the Convention required the Court to conclude that each of the plaintiffs had an agreement with the defendants that foreclosed a pure salvage claim. Therefore, it was unnecessary to reach the remaining questions to resolve whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment, and it was assumed that the Convention was enforceable in the US and that the vessel was not excluded by art 3.

Article 6.1 provides that:

This Convention shall apply to any salvage operations save to the extent that a contract otherwise provides expressly or by implication.

The plaintiffs did not dispute that they reached an agreement with the defendants to render aid to the vessel after Katrina had damaged it, and that they expected to be compensated for their efforts even if unsuccessful. Article 6.1 thus foreclosed the application of the Convention, even if it were otherwise applicable.

The plaintiffs were not entitled to rely upon art 17, which is entitled 'Services rendered under existing contracts' and provides:

No payment is due under the provisions of this Convention unless the services rendered exceed what can be reasonably considered as due performance of a contract entered into before the danger arose.

The plaintiffs knew the vessel had been severely damaged and knew of the risk involved. Their services to the vessel did not reasonably exceed due performance of the undertaking to which they agreed. The Convention afforded no basis for denying summary judgment in this case.

However, summary judgment should not have been granted regarding the amount of compensation. The record did not permit the conclusion that an express or implied agreement was reached that the plaintiffs would be compensated for their work on the same basis that they had been compensated prior to Katrina.