On 13 November 2002, the tanker Prestige was sailing within the territorial waters of Spain carrying 76,972 metric tons of heavy oil. At 14h10, the ship's crew heard a loud sound like an explosion followed by a list caused by a structural failure on the starboard side, producing an opening of the hull and releasing a large part of the cargo into the sea. The initial decision of the Spanish authorities was to tow the ship away from the Spanish coast to the high seas and this was ordered. The master refused the order, waiting for the operators' instructions, and accepting towage two-and-a-half hours later. The towage operation became problematic due to technical issues on the vessel and heavy weather conditions. On 19 November 2002, the ship broke up and sank. The oil spill caused severe pollution damage to the north and north-west coasts of Spain and the west coast of France, affecting private and public areas and installations including fishing and shellfishing businesses.

On 15 November 2002, the harbourmaster’s office of la Coruña, Spain, filed a criminal complaint against the master for obstruction and serious disobedience to the authority. The master was arrested the same day. The master of the ship and the general director of the Spanish Merchant Marine were charged for crimes against the environment, damage to protected natural areas, and criminal damage. The first engineer of the vessel was also accused of disobedience. The Spanish and French States and several other public and private entities, including local governments, municipalities, fishers associations and individuals joined the proceedings claiming criminal liability of the accused and civil liability of the companies involved. These included Universe Maritime Ltd (the owner and operator), Mare Shipping Inc (the registered owner), Crown Resources AG (the charterer or manager), American Bureau of Shipping (ABS, the classification society), the London Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association Ltd (the P&I Club), and the International Oil Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund). Some claimants also directed their actions against the Spanish State. The P&I Club deposited EUR 22,777,986 as the limited liability fund under art 5.3 of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 (CLC 1992) to which Spain is a party.

Held: The Court acquitted all the accused except for the master, who was convicted only for the crime of disobedience for not immediately following the order to allow towage, and who was sentenced to 9 months' prison. No civil liability was declared.

The Court found no evidence of the spill's cause as almost all of the technical advice and expert reports concluded that this could not be determined with accuracy. Some even stated that it could never be determined. The Court analysed the main theses proposed, ie an explosion, a collision with floating logs that had fallen overboard from another ship, an overloading of cargo, a huge wave, lack of maintenance, and defective repairs. However, the Court concluded that none of these was duly proven. In any case, the charges were not based on direct wilful malice or an intentional act or omission in performing the tasks of control, inspection, conservation, and maintenance with the purpose to sink the ship. Rather, it was alleged that they acted with imprudence, negligence or fault, which was also not proven.

The most extended thesis was that this type of ship was part of a fleet of old and unsuitable vessels with low operating costs, producing large profits for their unscrupulous operators. The Court rejected this argument, as the ship possessed all the certificates and documents required to operate. It had navigated without difficulties even during heavy weather when the event occurred; it was slow but apparently safe. Hence, the allegation that the accused were negligent in accepting the risk to navigate an unsafe ship failed as the prosecution could not demonstrate that the accused knew of the maintenance defects and the severe structural deficiencies that caused the sinking. Although there were some deficiencies, there was no evidence of illegal orders or the carriage of unacceptable or dangerous cargo. The control of the structural condition of the ship was the responsibility of ABS, who, it seems, did not perform a proper and thorough inspection.

The accusation against the general director of the Merchant Marine was based on the order to tow the vessel away from the Spanish coast, which, it was alleged, aggravated the damage. The Court said that, at first glance, this decision expanded the area affected by the oil spill, as opposed to if the vessel had been given refuge at any port or coastal area that would have reduced the geographical scope of the pollution. But this argument had to be contrasted with other aspects. The expert’s reports were contradictory, but the majority concluded that the best solution was to tow the vessel to a port of refuge. The main point was to determine if that option was viable, and if the known factors when that decision was made recommended that course of action. According to the evidence presented, it was not, and the general director acted with prudence according to the circumstances at the time. The Merchant Marine implemented the emergency plan, and the omission in constituting a technical advisory committee did not contribute to the worsening of the situation or the decisions made.

On civil liability, the Court said that it could not refer to the serious economic consequences of the oil spill as derived from the Penal Code articles, as they refer to damages resulting from a criminal act. If only a crime of disobedience was proven, this had not caused the oil spill damage. However, the Court stated some ad hoc criteria for the determination of damages and compensation. The Court stated that civil liability resulting from the delict (tort) has no specialisation other than its origin. The Court can establish its terms and extensions freely, according to the evidence in the trial. But the rules applicable to such determination cannot be other than those that govern civil liability. It is not admissible to ignore fundamental criteria for determining civil liability, and, importantly, one cannot overlook the liability rules for particular kinds of entities and legal persons. If there are certain legal norms or contractual agreements that limit some liabilities, they must be observed so that legal entities covered by those rules comply with them, responding within the limits established in those agreements.

The Prestige at least complied with the basic requirements and safeguards in the current legislation providing for legal navigation, but this was insufficient to meet the disastrous consequences of this casualty. That is why entities such as the IOPC Fund were created. It establishes some limitation to the compensation and binds many States, including Spain. Those limitations must be respected, not to avoid a dramatic disappearance of the entity, but to respect the limits of the matter, which is the reason for its existence. That means that the satisfaction of those economic liabilities that are not paid by this entity must be sought from other liable parties not covered by these limitations. The details of the confusing management of the Prestige's business might suggest that the responsible person was a legal entity of little financial ability that was absolutely incapable of responding for liability. That might be true, said the Court, and if tolerated in that business, it would be possible to invoke the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to identify the real responsible persons. It seemed that there was a quasi-identity between Mare Shipping and Universe Maritime. Although one of these entities was not part of this proceeding, that did not impede further consideration of this aspect if this management confusion was an instrument to avoid, or attempt to avoid, liability. The limitations of the IOPC Fund regarding the amount of compensation do not contradict the Spanish legal system. It is a liability detached from the concept of fault or negligence, even from any residual contractual criterion. It is similar to the insurance companies, which are also exempted from making payments beyond the legal limits. The IOPC Fund does not decide, but informs and offers settlements. The shipowner is entitled to limit its liability up to USD 136 million, while the IOPC Fund could pay up to USD 310 million, including the payment made by the shipowner and the insurance company.

On the application of the CLC 1992, the Court said that, although some parties objected to its application, it is an international norm incorporated into Spanish law, and it is of immediate and strict application. The P&I Club constituted the limitation of liability fund for its proportional distribution among the accepted claims. Article 7.9 of the CLC 1992 establishes a rigid obligation regarding to whom it must be paid. The distribution of that amount can only take place pursuant to the enforcement of an explicit order on civil liability, which is not the case here. In this case, the Court proceeded to acquit the accused of the crimes for which civil liability is claimed. Therefore, it is impossible to proceed now with the proportional distribution of the amount deposited without prejudice to the civil preventive measures of the parties that may have an interest in that sum and the decision of the P&I Club, which has not appeared in this proceedings. If the insurance company is interested in proceeding with a proportional distribution of the fund, that should be decided in the competent civil jurisdiction. The claimants recurred this decision in cassation to the Tribunal Supremo/Supreme Court: see The Prestige (CMI1141).