This claim involved a dispute over admiralty jurisdiction concerning damage to a vintage car. The car's owner, Mr Heilbrunn, the plaintiff, had arranged for the car to be shipped from England to Australia. The arrangement for the car's transportation was handled by Vantage Freight Services Pty Ltd, a Sydney-based freight forwarder, which engaged an English counterpart, Planetwide Ltd, to assist with the logistics. Planetwide, in turn, subcontracted Lightwood plc, the defendant, to load the car into a shipping container at their premises in North Weald, Essex, and then transport it by road to the port of Tilbury for onward shipping. During the loading process, the car was damaged by an employee of Lightwood, who attempted to drive the car into the container, resulting in around AUD 32,000 in repair costs upon the car’s return to Australia.

The transportation of the car was intended to be multimodal, involving both road and sea transport. The contractual documents relevant to the case included a FIATA (International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations) negotiable multimodal transport bill of lading, which was typically used to govern the terms of carriage involving multiple transportation modes and responsible parties. However, the specifics of the contract with the ocean carrier were not evident at the time the car was damaged, and no concrete evidence was provided about these terms during the proceedings.

The plaintiff brought an action, three years after the incident, against the defendant under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act), arguing that the Court had jurisdiction over the case as the claim constituted a 'general maritime claim' under s 4(3)(f) of the Act. This section covers claims ‘arising out of an agreement 'that relates to the carriage of goods or persons by a ship or to the use or hire of a ship, whether by charterparty or otherwise’.

The defendant challenged this on several grounds, including the location of the damage (occurring inland and prior to the maritime segment of its journey) and the contractual terms that were not clearly between the plaintiff and the defendant but rather between intermediary freight forwarders. The defendant further argued that the incident involving damage to the car did not qualify as a general maritime claim under the Act. His main contention was that the damage occurred while the car was being loaded onto a container, which was far from the port and prior to the maritime segment of its journey. This, he argued, did not have a sufficient connection to the carriage of goods by ship. To support his argument, the defendant referenced several cases, including Port of Geelong Authority v The Bass Reefer (1992) 37 FCR 374 (CMI703), where the Court held that the relationship implied by 'that relates to' must have a 'reasonably direct connection' with maritime activities, relying on Gatoil International Inc v Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co [1985] AC 255 (CMI694). The defendant's argument was that the loading process, occurring inland and separate from the maritime transport, lacked the direct maritime connection necessary to be considered under the Act. The defendant was merely a subcontractor who damaged the goods during this preliminary stage, suggesting that the connection to maritime transport was too indirect to establish jurisdiction under the Act.

Held: The motion is dismissed with costs.

The claim brought by the plaintiff, concerning damage to his vintage car while being loaded onto a shipping container for subsequent sea transport, qualified as a general maritime claim under s 4(3)(f) of the Act. The agreement to transport the car by sea, which included initial transportation by road to the port, was sufficiently connected to maritime activities. The loading of the car into a container for ocean transport, though it occurred on land and before the maritime portion of the journey, was integral to the process of maritime transport. The container’s loading was essentially a preparatory step in the chain of transportation that was directly related to the sea carriage which followed. Allsop J noted that the Full Court set out relevant interpretation principles of the Act in Tisand Pty Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV ‘Cape Morton’ (Ex ‘Freya’) (2005) 143 FCR 43 [59]-[65] (CMI661). The Act should be read in its legal and historical context, and the Act and the definitions of maritime claims have an international as well as a domestic maritime context, including the Arrest Convention 1952 and the Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 33 on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction (the ALRC Report).

The second consideration is that provisions conferring jurisdiction or granting powers to courts should be interpreted liberally and without imposing limitations not found in the express words: The ‘Shin Kobe Maru’ 181 CLR 421 (CMI2030).

The third consideration is a particular aspect of the importance of the context provided by the ALRC Report. In Owners of MV ‘Iran Amanat’ v KMP Coastal Oil Pte Ltd (1999) 196 CLR 130, 138 the High Court stressed the importance of the background of English legislation and authority and any settled international construction:

The Australian legislation having been enacted against the background of English legislation and authority set out above, the definition of 'relevant person' should be understood as having the same meaning as the courts had given to the corresponding words in the English statute. When the Parliament has enacted legislation, affecting the subject of international shipping, and followed a statutory precedent from overseas which has by then received a settled construction, there is every reason to construe the statutory language in the same way in this country unless such construction is unreasonable or inapplicable to Australian circumstances. …

The ALRC Report recommended that the proposed head of jurisdiction (s 4(3)(f)) follow the language of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) (the 1981 Act), s 20(2)(h). Section 4(3)(f) of the Act did follow, though not precisely, the language of the 1981 UK Act, s 20(2)(h). That section was as follows: 'any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship'.

It is also important for the application of the principles attending construction of the Act to understand that the provisions in the UK Acts were passed to enable the United Kingdom to ratify and to comply with its international obligations under the Arrest Convention 1952: The ‘Eschersheim’ [1976] 1 WLR 430 at 434 (per Lord Diplock) (CMI2166) and Gatoil [1985] AC at 266 (per Lord Keith). Article 1.1 of the Convention contained the following as part of the list of 'maritime claims':

'Maritime claim' means a claim arising out of one or more of the following: …

(d) agreement relating to the use or hire of any ship whether by charterparty or otherwise;

(e) agreement relating to the carriage of goods in any ship whether by charterparty or otherwise; ...

Given the unanimous decisions of the final court of appeal in the United Kingdom interpreting domestic legislation having its origins in an international Convention, one aim of which was to bring uniformity of approach among different legal systems, and the desirability of international uniformity, or at least broad consistency, and an expressed suggestion by the ALRC (which was heeded) that Parliament follow the wording of the UK Acts, necessarily constrain the interpretation of s 4(3)(f), certainly at first instance.

Given the need for the Convention to apply to a wide variety of legal systems and given the capacity of maritime claims to arise by reference to chartering and carriage arrangements often of some complexity, it would make little practical sense to limit the types of claims to which this paragraph was directed to contractual claims between parties to the agreement. Secondly, the provision is one in which jurisdiction is given to a Court. It should be read liberally. Thus, the fact that the plaintiff’s claim is in tort and bailment does not mean that it cannot arise out of an agreement of the character described in s 4(3)(f).