MÖ bought a Cadillac car and four extra wheels on the internet. The car was delivered to the Port of Miami, Florida, USA. On 24 September 2009, MÖ entered into an agreement with Nordtrafik Aktiebolag (Nordtrafik) for sea transport of the car and wheels from Miami to Gothenburg, Sweden. However, they were never shipped from the United States. Instead, because the necessary export documentation was not provided to Nordtrafik's agent, CFR Rinkens, they were eventually sold in a forced sale to cover the cost of renting space at the Florida terminal.

On 1 October 2012, MÖ brought an action against Nordtrafik in the Falun District Court. The Falun District Court dismissed the claim on 22 January 2013 on the basis that the action was brought before the wrong Court. MÖ then filed a claim in the Gothenburg District Court on 12 April 2013, demanding that Nordtrafik pay him SEK 89,673 plus interest. Nordtrafik claimed that MÖ's claim for damages was statute-barred because the action was not brought within one year from the time the car should have been handed over in Gothenburg, or the loss could be ascertained.

The District Court held that MÖ's claim was not statute-barred. Nordtrafik appealed to the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden. The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court judgment. Nordtrafik appealed again to the Supreme Court.

Held: Appeal upheld. MÖ's claim is statute-barred.

The main question is whether the disputed claim is statute-barred under the Maritime Code 1994 (the Code). In this case, the question arises whether MÖ's claim for compensation for the lost car constitutes such a claim as is referred to in Ch 19 s 1.5 of the Code and, if so, at what time the limitation period begins to run. According to this provision, a claim for compensation ceases due to goods being damaged, lost, or delayed in carriage, if the action is not brought within one year of the goods being handed over, or should have been handed over. The rule in the Code deviates, like other statutes of limitations in transport law, in certain respects from the general rules in the Statute of Limitations Act 1981. Characteristic of the special provisions of transport law is that they are based on international Conventions and that the limitation periods are significantly shorter than according to the general rules. The reasons for the short limitation periods are mainly to speed up the final settlement of the debt relationship and to create clarity regarding the legal relationship.

The statute of limitations in the transport law regulations only covers such claims for compensation that appear from the respective regulations. This initially raises the question of the extent of the carrier's liability under the Code. According to the transport agreement with a consignor, a maritime carrier undertakes to receive goods of a certain type and quantity in one place for transport to another place, where it must be discharged at the right time, in the same condition and to the right person. According to what has been said, the carrier's responsibility includes various elements such as an accounting responsibility, a data responsibility, a procurement responsibility, a delay responsibility, a care responsibility and a delivery responsibility.

The cargo care responsibility, which is central to the transport promise, has been designed as a mandatory responsibility for one's own or someone else's presumed negligence (see Ch 13 s 25 of the Code). The sea transporter can invoke certain grounds for discharge from liability, of which so-called nautical errors are particularly noticeable (see s 26). The liability is also limited to a certain amount for each transported package or kilo (see s 30).

The rules on carrier liability are mandatory for the benefit of the transport customer (Ch 13 ss 4 and 4a of the Code). This mandatory liability applies throughout the liability period. This period is stated in Ch 13 s 24 (see also s 25). The carrier's responsibility begins when the goods are in its care in the port of loading, which is considered to be from the time when the carrier or its people receive it there (Bill 1993/94:195 p 236). The responsibility applies during the entire transport and it ends when the goods in the port of unloading are handed over to the person entitled to receive them in a certain specified manner.

The Swedish transport law legislation, which has been added through Nordic co-operation, is largely Convention-based. This was the case with the carriage rules in Ch 5 of the Maritime Code of 1891, which were revised with regard to the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules from 1924 and 1968, respectively. The current Code has been adapted to the Hamburg Rules from 1978. However, Sweden is still bound in international law by the Hague-Visby Rules, while the Hamburg Rules have not been adopted. The liability rules for general cargo transport in the current Code have been designed with regard to Sweden's Convention obligations. This is shown in the fact that the rules on eg nautical error, package and kilo restrictions, and limitation periods have been maintained as they appear in the Hague-Visby Rules. In other respects, the rules have been modeled on the Hamburg Rules.

The period of liability in the Maritime Code of 1891 was based on the so-called tackle-to-tackle principle introduced in art 1.e of the Hague-Visby Rules. According to that principle, the carrier's compulsory liability covers the time from the time the goods are loaded until they are unloaded from the vessel. The Hamburg Rules extend the mandatory liability in such a way that it also covers the entire period during which the carrier has the goods in its care in the port area (art 4). This is an adaptation to modern general cargo handling, and the Nordic maritime laws are thus now designed in accordance with this.

Within the Nordic maritime law committees, which worked out the new Nordic maritime laws, it was discussed whether an extension of the maritime law's mandatory liability period in accordance with the Hamburg Rules would be contrary to Sweden's Convention obligations under art 7 of the Hague-Visby Rules. According to this article, the provisions of the Convention do not prevent a carrier from disclaiming responsibility for the time before loading and after unloading from the ship. The rule thus refers only to provisions set out in the Convention. The committees' conclusion was that art 7 could not be interpreted in such a way that in national law it must be possible to disclaim liability under the extended period.

The liability period prescribed by s 24 of the Code thus constitutes a starting point with regard to the examination of the carrier's liability. The definition of 'carriage of goods' in art 1.e of the Hague-Visby Rules is linked to the period of liability applicable under those Rules. The provisions on the carrier's liability period in the Code are based on the Hamburg Rules instead. When interpreting provisions in the Code that are related to the carrier's liability period, guidance should therefore not be sought in the Hague-Visby Rules.

Decisive for the assessment of the prescription issue in the present case is how the expression 'in carriage' ('vid befordran') in Ch 19 s 1.5 of the Code should be interpreted [which provides for prescription of 'a claim for compensation because goods have been damaged, lost or delayed in carriage or because incorrect or incomplete information has been provided in the bill of lading: within one year of the goods being handed over or should have been handed over'].

The question is whether this wording means that the right to compensation due to loss of goods outside the actual stage of carriage does not fall within the scope of the provision. The assessment should take into account the law's system and origin. The term 'in carriage' was introduced in the statute of limitations in the Maritime Code of 1891 through an amendment in 1974 (see Bill 1973:137 ). The change was not commented on in more detail in the preparatory work. At the same time, the then Ch 5, which was entitled 'On Chartering' and included both cargo and passenger transport, was revised. The Chapter was divided into separate parts. Against the stated background, the introduction of the term 'in carriage' in the statute of limitations should be understood as a systematic consequential change based on the overall term for freight agreements in the Code.

The Conventions that form the basis for the statutory rules of the Code lack a specification that corresponds to the expression 'in carriage'. Article 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules completely lacks such a provision. Here, instead, the scope of the statute of limitations follows from the definition of 'carriage of goods' in art 1.e and the period of liability that follows from this. Article 20 of the Hamburg Rules states that an action is prescribed which 'relates to the carriage of goods' under the Convention. There is nothing in these Conventions to give reason to believe that the scope of the limitation rules would be limited in relation to the period prescribed for the mandatory carrier liability.

In the maritime laws of other Nordic countries, the statute of limitations has been formulated in a slightly different way. The Finnish Maritime Act has a rule corresponding to the Swedish one. In the Norwegian and Danish maritime laws, on the other hand, the provision 'in carriage' is missing. It can thus be considered clear that it is the carrier's liability in its entirety that is covered by the statute of limitations according to the laws of the latter countries.

In other modes of transport, prescription of claims regarding compensation for loss or damage of goods has been linked to the period that applies to the carrier's liability (see s 41 of the Act on Domestic Road Transport 1974, and on this NJA 2007 s 879, art 32 of CMR; art 35 (and see art 18.3 of the Montreal Convention; art 48.c read with art 23.1 of the CIM 1999).

In view of what has been stated, the scope of application of the statute of limitations in Ch 19 s 1.5 of the Code has the same scope as the maritime carrier's liability during the responsibility period. In this context, it will thus be decisive what responsibility the carrier has assumed under the contract of carriage and what mandatory rules apply to that contract.

In the event of prescription according to the rule in Ch 19 s 1.5 of the Code, the period of one year begins to run when the goods were handed over or should have been handed over. The rule is - as has been stated above - applicable during the carrier's entire liability period. The question is when the limitation period for the claim due to loss of goods begins to run in a case where the actual transport has not begun.

The statute of limitations rests on the idea that the recipient has reason to safeguard its right at the time when the goods have been handed over or should have been handed over. It is only then that the recipient can assess whether it has a claim against the carrier. If the transport has not started, it can be difficult for the consignee to determine when the goods would have been handed over in a purely legal assessment. There is often a lack of more precise regulation of the transport deadline in the parties' agreements. The carrier must, according to Ch 13 s 12.1 of the Code, perform the transport with due care and urgency. Normally, it should therefore be possible to determine the times that apply as the starting point for the limitation period based on a normal transport time, but this seldom provides any further guidance for the assessment of when the transport could have started. Circumstances such as the availability of ships and cargo space then instead become decisive, and the time for transport can only be determined in close proximity to this. When loss of goods has occurred before the transport has been actualised, it is therefore not always possible to even determine on a standard basis when the goods would have been handed over, and thus not possible for the recipient to assess with a reasonable degree of certainty whether there is a basis for a claim.

In certain transport law regulations, unlike in the Code, there are special provisions on the time for calculating the limitation period in the event of loss of goods, or when the limitation period must in any case begin to run (see arts 32.1.b and 32.1.c of the CMR; and arts 48.2.a and 48.2.c of the CIM). In the absence of explicit provisions, it is not possible to apply any corresponding rule to the transport of general cargo by sea. Against this background, the statute of limitations in the Code may in a case such as this be understood and interpreted in the light of the purposes on which it is based, that the final settlement of the debt relationship can take place quickly, and to create clarity.

According to Ch 13 s 12.1 of the Code, the carrier shall take care of the goods handled and also otherwise take into account the interests of the cargo owner. This means that the carrier, amongst other things, has to inform the other party of what happens to goods that are seized. It is also expressly stated in s 12.3 that the carrier shall notify the person specified by the consignor when the goods have been lost, for example. These rules help to ensure that the cargo owner side has reason to monitor its rights at the latest at the time of such notification.

If it is not possible to determine the time when the goods would have been handed over, it should be possible to pay attention at the time of the notification that the goods have been lost. At that time, it is clear to the recipient that the goods will not be able to be handed over. The one-year period for prescription of a claim for compensation for lost goods should therefore in such a case be considered to run from the time when a competent person on the part of the cargo owner receives a notification that the goods have been lost. The llimitation period will then not start to run before the recipient becomes aware of the circumstances on which a claim can be based. This appears to be particularly important in the case of transport law special prescription, in view of the short deadlines that apply there.

Here, Nordtrafik undertook to transport the car from Miami to Gothenburg. The car was handed over to Nordtrafik's agent at the port terminal in Miami. The responsibility period according to the transport agreement thus begun at that time. The car was later sold at an executive auction. MÖ's claim due to this loss is thus covered by the statute of limitations in Ch 19, s 1.5 of the Code. No transportation of the car was ever initiated, because no documentation of export from the United States was provided to the agent. MÖ was of the opinion that the transport would still be carried out as soon as the required documents had been produced. However, on 22 September 2011, he was informed by Nordtrafik's agent that the car had been sold at an executive auction. From that time, according to what had previously been stated, he had one year to bring an action against Nordtrafik. The action against Nordtrafik has thus been brought too late and is statute-barred.