This case involved collisions that occurred on 15 July 2018 in a southbound convoy of eight vessels proceeding through the southern section of the Suez Canal. At about 17h50 the vessel at the head of the convoy, the Aeneas, a container vessel, had an engine problem and, by about 18h20, was anchored. Thereafter, the other vessels either took steps to moor or prepared to moor. Not all were successful. At about 19h48 the eighth (and last) vessel, the Panamax Alexander (PA), a laden bulk carrier, collided with the seventh vessel in the convoy, the Sakizaya Kalon (SK), another laden bulk carrier, which was at anchor. After the PA had collided with the SK, those two vessels, at about 20h02, collided with the Osios David (OD), another laden bulk carrier which was anchored and moored. The three vessels ended up in a triangle across the Canal, with the SK heading towards the east bank, the PA heading towards the west bank and the OD heading down the Canal. The bows of the PA and the OD were in contact with each other, the stern of the SK was in contact with the stern of the OD and the bows of the SK were in contact with the stern of the PA.

The collisions between these three vessels generated claims totalling some USD 18 million.

Held: The collision between the PA and the SK at 19h48 was caused by the fault of the PA in failing to moor before KM 149 in the Suez Canal.

This is an unusual case where a causative fault occurred more than an hour before the collision: (a) the vessels were navigating in a convoy through the Suez Canal where, following the engine failure and anchoring of the vessel at the head of the convoy, it was necessary for vessels astern of that ship to moor; (b) submarine cables between KM 149 and KM 150.5 prevented vessels from mooring, assisted with the use of an anchor, between KM 149 and KM 150.5; (c) the SK was likely to moor either north of KM 149 or south of KM 150.5, and so the PA had to moor north of KM 149; and (d) for the hour before the collision the PA was proceeding at no more than 5 knots and was later proceeding at between 1.2 and 2.3 knots.

The PA's further failure to moor, assisted by the use of an anchor, as soon as the PA had passed KM 150.5, also contributed to the collision. There was no causative fault by either the SK or the OD.

In his submissions, counsel for the OD submitted that the later collisions 'cascaded' from the first. This was challenged by counsel for the PA who submitted that there were separate and very serious faults by the SK and the OD which caused or contributed to the later collisions. But, on the Court's findings, there were no such further faults. Does it follow that the chain of causation between the first and the later collisions was not broken so that the PA must also be held responsible for the later collisions?

In The Calliope [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 84, 96 counsel conceded that where A has suffered direct damage as a result of a collision caused by B and has also suffered consequential damage at a later time and at a different place without any further causative negligence by A, B is liable for that consequential damage also. No such concession was made in the present case. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the PA's fault in causing the collision with the SK at 19h48 was also the cause in law of the later collisions between the PA and the OD and between the SK and the OD at 20h03, the yet later collisions between those vessels at 20h13 and 20h14, and the final collision between the PA and the SK at 20h18.

That question of causation depends upon whether the effect of the first collision was continuing in such a way as not merely to provide the opportunity for the later collisions but as to constitute the cause of them. The courts have answered questions of this nature (which usually arise where there has been intervening negligence) by the use of metaphors. Was the hand of the negligent navigator on board the PA still heavy on the SK and the OD at the time of the later collisions? Were those on board the SK and the OD not free agents by reason of the hard necessities imposed on them by the first collision? Were those on board the SK and the OD still in the grip of the first collision? These metaphors and their source are described by Brandon J in The Calliope at 101. Such questions are to be approached in a broad common sense way: see ibid 102.

The Court had no doubt that the first collision at 19h48 not merely provided the opportunity for the later collisions, but constituted the cause of them.

After the first collision the master and pilot of the SK were in the grip of the first collision and could not be expected to put the SK's engines ahead and rudder hard to starboard with a view to preventing the rotation of the stern of the SK towards the OD. Similarly, it was unwise for the OD to attempt to move from its moored position. All it could do was attempt to turn the bow of the OD to starboard away from the approaching PA. The first collision was the real and effective cause of the collisions at 20h03.

After the collisions at 20h03, the three vessels moved down the Canal in the shape of the triangle. That triangle is a graphic display of the grip in which the SK and the OD were held as a result of the collisions at 19h48 and at 20h03. The first collision remained a real and effective cause of the later collisions which occurred at 20h13 and 20h14. There was nothing that the SK could reasonably do to avoid the later collisions and the PA understandably applied astern engine power to arrest or control the drift downstream of the OD.

The final contact was between the SK and the PA at 20h18 as the SK and the PA lay on reciprocal headings. They had reached this remarkable position after they had been 'released' from the triangle and the stern of the SK continued to swing. In a broad and common sense way the first collision must be regarded as the real and effective cause of this final contact.