The respondent, Martropico Compania Naviera SA, was the owner of the Ibnu. The respondent time chartered the Ibnu to the appellant, who was the owner of the Permina 108. The appellant failed to pay charter hire for the Ibnu and the respondent arrested the Permina 108.

The appellant filed a motion for the proceedings to be set aside on the ground that the High Court had no in rem jurisdiction over the Permina 108 because the claim in relation to the charter of the Ibnu had no connection with the Permina 108. The said application was made pursuant to s 4(4) of the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act (the Act) which is broadly equivalent to art 3 of the International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships 1952 (the Arrest Convention 1952).

The motion was dismissed and the appellant appealed.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

Pursuant to s 4(4) of the Act, a ship (the arrested ship) may be arrested if: (i) the arrested ship is the property of the person liable in personam (the relevant person) when the action is brought; and (ii) the relevant person must, at the time the cause of action arose, be (among other things) either the owner of charterer of the ship in connection (offending ship) with which the claim arose.

The Court of Appeal held that the word charterer in s 4(4) is not limited to a charterer by demise but applied to all types of charterers, including time charterers. This is because if the legislature had intended to limit the meaning of the word 'charterer' to a 'charterer by demise', they would have expressly added the words 'by demise' after the word 'charterer'. As the word 'charterer' was not given any limitations, this word had to be given its ordinary meaning which includes all types of charterers.

The Court found that the words of s 4(4) of the Act, given their plain and ordinary meaning, were free of any ambiguity and were not reasonably capable of more than one meaning. It followed that it was unnecessary and indeed it would be wrong to look at the Arrest Convention 1952 to arrive at the proper construction of the Act. Furthermore, Singapore, even when it was a colony of the United Kingdom, was not one of the colonies to which the United Kingdom had under art 18 extended the Arrest Convention 1952 and since independence Singapore has not acceded under art 15 to the Arrest Convention 1952.

The respondent was therefore entitled to arrest the Permina 108 because: (i) the appellant was the registered owner of the Permina 108 at the date of issuance of the writ; and (ii) the appellant was the relevant person as it was the time charterer of the Ibnu, which was the ship in connection with which the respondent's claim arose (ie the offending ship).

In so finding, the Court departed from The Eschersheim [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1 (CMI2166), which set out a requirement for both the offending ship and the arrested ship to be beneficially owned by the same party. The court was of the view that Lord Diplock’s comments on the class of ships liable to arrest were not part of the ratio decidendi and that the construction of s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK), which is in pari materia with s 4(4) of the Singapore Act, was not dealt with in argument before the House of Lords. In this passage of his speech Lord Diplock was comparing the United Kingdom Act with the Arrest Convention 1952 so as to identify, in connection with which a claim under s 1(1) of the UK Act arose, the particular ship which is liable to arrest under cl (a) and was not particularly concerned with construing cl (b). It is also clear from his speech that he considered the terms of the Arrest Convention 1952 were relevant in construing the provisions of the UK Act. The Court disagreed with the construction which Lord Diplock had given to cl (b).