This was an application for judicial review concerning a rare claim for salvage in respect of a wreck. The salvage claim concerned eight bronze cannon, said to be worth between GBP 96,000 and GBP 1.2 m, from a 200 year old East India company vessel. The claim also concerned wreck from several other vessels (the Toward, the Latona, and the Harlingen) that were said to be up to 150 years old. The recovered wreck included tin ingots thought to be worth GBP 110,000, and miscellaneous less valuable items (saucers, mugs, cups, chamber pots, portholes, and navigational lamps).

The salvors, Mr Knight and Mr Huzzey, were prosecuted and convicted in 2013 for offences contrary to ss 236 and 237 Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK), in respect of wreck taken from the Harlingen, three German submarines and the East India vessels. Section 236 requires a person who finds or takes possession of a wreck in UK waters to give notice to the Receiver of Wrecks that they have found or taken possession of it and s 237 requires those items be delivered to the Receiver. Section 236 says that on conviction a person shall forfeit any claim to salvage. Section 237 does not contain such a provision.

The offence relating to the East India company vessel, to which Mr Knight pleaded guilty, was a s 237 offence. Mr Knight accepted that he was not entitled to a salvage reward in respect of the s 236 offences but maintained his claim to salvage in respect to the other items, in particular the eight bronze cannon and tin ingots.

In refusing Mr Knight’s claim, the Receiver referred to art 18 of the Salvage Convention 1989, and said that in case of salvor misconduct a salvor will be deprived of the whole or part of any payment due. She said that all the items listed had formed part of the prosecution against him and it would be ‘inappropriate for any salvage award to be paid and would be contrary to public policy’. Mr Knight said that art 18 of the Convention only required fraud or other dishonest conduct during salvage operations. There had been no dishonest conduct during the operations and therefore the Receiver’s conduct was unlawful. Mr Knight further claimed that he had not been afforded procedural fairness as he had never been given an opportunity to respond to the suggestion that he was guilty of dishonest conduct. Finally, he said that the Receiver was following an unpublished policy, which was contrary to the Convention and art 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Held: The claim for salvage was time-barred and the claim for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for Transport refusing salvage dismissed. The two year limitation period imposed by art 23 commences when the 'salvage operations' are terminated. The Convention does not define how salvage operations are deemed terminated, and this will be a question of fact to be determined in every case. Teare J found that salvage operations in respect of the eight bronze cannon terminated in 2008, and therefore the limitation period in which to institute judicial proceedings to claim salvage expired in 2010. The salvage operations in respect of the ingots terminated in 2010, and thus the limitation period ended no later than 2012. In respect of the miscellaneous items, the salvage operations ended in 2011, and therefore the limitation period ended in 2013.

Despite the time bar, Teare J expressed his view (obiter) on Mr Knight's claim that the dishonest conduct referred to in art 18 of the Salvage Convention is confined to conduct 'committed by the salvor in the course of the actual salvage operation'. In Teare J’s judgment, the article provides that a salvor may be deprived of the whole or part of the payment due under the Convention in two circumstances. First, where the salvage operations have become necessary or more difficult because of the salvor’s fault or neglect. Second, where the salvor has been guilty of fraud or other dishonest conduct. There is no requirement that such conduct must be in the course of the salvage operations but the fraud or dishonest conduct must have some real connection with the salvage services or making of the claim for salvage. Otherwise, it is unlikely a court would regard the fraud or dishonest conduct as having any relevance.