The defendant was riding a Yamaha Waverunner jet-ski (Waverunner) when he collided with another jet-ski. The rider of the other jet-ski was seriously injured.

The defendant was indicted with an offence under s 58(2)(a) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK) (the Act). Section 58 applied, among others, to the 'master' of a UK ship or of a ship registered under the law of a country outside the UK. Section 313 of the Act defined 'ship' as including 'every description of vessel used in navigation'.

Regulation 4 of SI 1991 No 1366 applied s 58 to 'sea-going ships … wholly owned by a person resident in … the United Kingdom … which are entitled to be registered in the United Kingdom under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 but are not registered whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere … and to masters and seamen employed in them'.

The Waverunner was not registered in the UK or elsewhere and was owned by the defendant, who was a resident of the UK.

At the Crown Court the defendant applied to have the indictment quashed on the ground that the Waverunner was not a 'ship' within s 58(1) of the Act because it was not a 'vessel used in navigation' within the meaning of s 313 of the Act. The Judge dismissed the application and the defendant pleaded guilty, on the basis that he was the 'master' of the Waverunner and had been in breach of duty in failing to keep a good lookout.

The defendant appealed against the conviction and sentence. The Crown accepted that the Waverunner was not a 'ship' in the normal meaning of the word, but submitted that the normal meaning was extended by the definition of 'ship' in s 313 of the Act as including 'every description of vessel used in navigation'. In that context, 'navigation' involved no more than controlled travel over water. The defendant argued that the Waverunner did not fall within the definition of a 'ship' because of the nature of its construction, and because it was not 'used in navigation'. Moreover, it was not a 'sea-going' ship within the meaning of the statutory instrument, and the defendant was not employed as its master within the meaning of s 58 of the Act.

Held: Appeal allowed.

The Court considered several authorities. Steedman v Scofield [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 163 involved a collision between a jet-ski and a speedboat. The owner of the latter brought a claim in negligence, and the defendants sought to have it struck out as time-barred under s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK) (the MCA) (based on art 7 of the Collision Convention 1910). The time limit under that section related to any claim against a 'vessel'. Section 10 of the MCA provided that it was to be construed as one with the Merchant Shipping Acts.

Section 742 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (the 1894 Act) provided that 'vessel' includes any ship or boat, or any description of vessel used in navigation: 'ship' includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars.

Sheen J held that the jet-ski did not fall within this definition. Part of the reason for Sheen J’s conclusion was the nature of the construction of the jet-ski. It was very different from the Waverunner. The Court held that it was not possible to conclude, on the basis of its construction alone, that it was incapable of falling within the first part of the definition of a ship in s 313 of the Act, namely 'every description of vessel'. Of much more importance is the qualification that the definition adds to that phrase, namely 'used in navigation'.

Curtis v Wild [1991] 4 All ER 172 was an action by one dinghy sailor against another for personal injuries as a result of being run down after capsizing. The issue was whether the claim was subject to the two-year limitation period imposed in relation to claims against vessels or their owners by section 8 of the MCA, which fell to be construed as one with the Merchant Shipping Acts. Henry J concluded that navigation involved proceeding from an originating place A to a terminus B and not just the 'use of vessels for pleasure purposes by people who were messing about in boats'.

The Court held that in considering the effect of these authorities one must not lose sight of the context in which the issue of the meaning of a 'ship' arises. This was not easy, as the Act consolidates a number of statutes dealing with shipping, not least of which is the 1894 Act, itself a consolidating Act. Whilst there may be reasons for giving 'ship' a wide meaning for the purposes of Pt I of the Act which deals with registration, one must not adopt a meaning that makes a nonsense of other provisions which govern the use and operation of ships. Those provisions, as the title 'Merchant Shipping' suggests, were primarily aimed at shipping as a trade or business. While it may be possible to extend the meaning of ship to vessels which were not employed in trade or business, or which were smaller than those which would normally be so employed, if this was taken too far the reduction could become absurd.

The Court concluded that those authorities which confined 'vessel used in navigation' to vessels that were used to make ordered progression over the water from one place to another, were correctly decided. The words 'used in navigation' exclude from the definition of 'ship or vessel' craft that are simply used for having fun on the water without the object of going anywhere, into which category jet-skis plainly fall. For this reason alone, it was wrong to hold that s 58 of the Act applied to the facts of this case.

A sea-going vessel is a vessel which sets out to sea on a voyage. While jet-skis are used on the sea in proximity to land, they do not go to sea on voyages, nor would they be seaworthy in heavy weather. This was a further reason for allowing this appeal.

Section 58 of the Act only applied to a master who was employed as such. As the defendant was not employed as the master of the Waverunner, s 58 did not apply to him.