On 31 July 2016, an Italian speedboat, piloted by Mr C G and insured by the intervening party, collided with a zodiac flying the French flag, the occupants of which were injured. The investigating Judge referred Mr G to the Maritime Court on criminal charges for causing the injuries, as well as non-compliance with COLREGs. The Court rejected Mr G's objection of incompetence of the French courts, found him guilty of the charges, and ruled on civil interests. Mr G appealed in respect of both the criminal and civil proceedings against him.
Held: Partial cassation.
There is no basis for cassation in respect of the criminal action.
The third ground of appeal proposed for Mr G criticises the contested judgment for rejecting his objection of incompetence in respect of the civil action. The Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) Convention 1952, of which France and Italy are both States parties, provides as follows in art 1:
(1) An action for collision occurring between seagoing vessels, or between seagoing vessels and inland navigation craft, can only be introduced:
(a) either before the Court where the defendant has his habitual residence or a place of business;
(b) or before the Court of the place where arrest has been effected of the defendant ship or of any other ship belonging to the defendant which can be lawfully arrested, or where arrest could have been effected and bail or other security has been furnished;
(c) or before the Court of the place of collision when the collision has occurred within the limits of a port or in inland waters.
G argued that, as the parties to the dispute were not all French nationals; the ships involved in the collision flew the flag of two States parties to the Convention, France and Italy; and the incident had occurred 1,300 m from the coastline, and was therefore outside French internal waters, the Court of Appeal should have applied art 1 of the Convention, a legal standard having superior authority over art 418 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and upheld its incompetence to rule. By retaining jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal disregarded art 1 of the Convention and art 55 of the Constitution. The insurer similarly criticised the judgment under appeal in that it rejected the exception of incompetence of the French courts to rule on the civil action, and disregarded the Convention.
The Court held that this ground of appeal was justified, having regard to arts 1.1.a and 1.1.c of the Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) Convention 1952. In rejecting the jurisdictional objection raised by Mr G and his insurer, the Court of Appeal held that that these Convention provisions were applicable to civil proceedings brought before the civil courts; however, they did not prevent, in accordance with the provisions of art 418 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a civil action incidentally brought before a criminal court which had been regularly seized of the charge of a collision between seagoing vessels, and had previously ruled on the criminal action.
In ruling in this way, the Court of Appeal misunderstood the meaning and scope of the above provisions. First, in the absence of a reservation entered by France, no provision of domestic law can have the effect of setting aside a rule of jurisdiction relating to a civil action expressly laid down by an international treaty. Second, where the collision took place not in internal waters, but in the territorial sea, the Court where the defendant has its habitual residence or place of business has sole jurisdiction.
Cassation is therefore incurred on this ground. The cassation only concerns the provisions relating to the exception of incompetence relating to the civil action and to that action itself. The other findings of the Court of Appeal will therefore be maintained.