The respondent, having sold and agreed to deliver goods to a Spanish company, arranged for their ocean carriage on the SS Castillo Ampudia from Baltimore, Maryland, to Valencia, Spain. The goods, consisting of 62 cases, were transported from Detroit by flatcar to a point on the Baltimore pier alongside the ship, and were there taken in charge by its agent for loading and shipment. A bill of lading was prepared by the respondent, on the carrier's form, which was submitted to, and signed by, an agent of the carrier. The value of the goods was not declared by the respondent or inserted in the bill of lading.

The appellant, an independent stevedoring company, was orally engaged by the carrier to load the cargo onto the ship. While endeavouring to load one of the cases, containing a press weighing 19 tons, the appellant's employees caused it to fall into the harbour and be extensively damaged. The respondent then brought an action in the District Court against the appellant in negligence. The appellant denied negligence, and asserted, alternatively, that if the damage was caused by its negligence, its liability was limited to USD 500 by the limitation of liability provisions in the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), and the parallel provisions of the bill of lading. COGSA in 46 USC s 1304(5) provides: 'Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United States unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.'

The District Court held that the damage to the press was caused by the appellant's negligence; that the limitation provisions in the bill of lading were, in express terms, applicable only to the carrier, and did not apply to nor limit the liability of the stevedore; and that the respondent was entitled to recover the full amount of its damages (145 F Supp 554). On appeal, the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed (4th Cir, 256 F 2d 946). The Court of Appeals held that neither the limitation provisions of COGSA nor the bill of lading were applicable to, or limited the liability of, the stevedoring company, and that it was therefore liable for the full damage caused by its negligence. The Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with, and declined to follow, the majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit in AM Collins & Co v Panama R Co 197 F 2d 893, holding that the dissenting opinion in that case presented the correct view.

Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

The appellant first contends that the liability-limiting provisions of COGSA and the bill of lading should be construed to limit its liability as well as that of the carrier. Second, it contends that even if it be held that those provisions limit only the liability of the 'carrier', it is nevertheless protected by the carrier's limitation under the theory and holding of the majority opinion in the Collins case.

With regard to the appellant's first contention, this Court looks first to the provisions, legislative history and environment of COGSA, and next to the limiting provisions of the bill of lading, to determine whether Congress by COGSA, or the shippers and the carrier by the bill of lading, evidenced any intention to limit the liability of negligent agents of a carrier.

COGSA is clearly phrased. It defines the term 'carrier' to include 'the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with the shipper': s 1301(a). It imposes particularised duties and obligations upon, and grants stated immunities to, the 'carrier': ss 1302, 1303, 1304. Regarding limitation of the amount of liability for loss of or damage to goods, it says that 'neither the carrier nor the ship' shall be liable for more than USD 500 per package: s 1304(5). It makes no reference to stevedores or agents. The legislative history of COGSA shows that it was lifted almost bodily from the Hague Rules of 1921, as amended by the Brussels Convention of 1924: 51 Stat 233.5. The aim of those Rules was to establish uniform ocean bills of lading to govern the rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers inter se in international trade. They do not advert to stevedores or agents of a carrier. The debates and Committee Reports in the Senate and the House upon the Bill that became COGSA likewise do not mention stevedores or agents. There is, thus, nothing in the language, the legislative history, or environment of COGSA that expressly or impliedly indicates any intention of Congress to regulate stevedores or other agents of a carrier, or to limit the amount of their liability for damages caused by their negligence. It must be assumed that Congress knew that generally agents are liable for all damages caused by their negligence. Yet Congress, while limiting the amount of liability of 'the carrier [and] the ship', did not even refer to stevedores or agents of a carrier. 'We can only conclude that if Congress had intended to make such an inroad on the rights of claimants (against negligent agents) it would have said so in unambiguous terms' and 'in the absence of a clear Congressional policy to that end, we cannot go so far': Brady v Roosevelt SS Co 317 US 575, 581, 584, 63 S Ct 425, 428, 429, 430, 87 L Ed 471.

The limitation provisions in the bill of lading also do not advert to stevedores or agents. Instead they deal only with the 'Carrier's liability' to the shippers. They say that 'the Carrier's liability, if any, shall be determined on the basis of $500 per package'. There is, thus, nothing in those provisions to indicate that the contracting parties intended to limit the liability of stevedores or other agents of the carrier for damages caused by their negligence. If this had been a purpose of the contracting parties it must be presumed that they would in some way have expressed it in the contract.

Turning to the appellant's second argument regarding the Collins case, the holding of the majority in Collins that the liability of a negligent agent of a carrier, though not limited by any statute or contract, is nevertheless limited by, and to the extent of, the limitation granted by the shipper to the carrier in the bill of lading, simply because the agent is performing some part of the work thereby undertaken by the carrier, is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court.

The appellant claims that its position is supported by the decision of the House of Lords in Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd [1924] AC 522, (1924) 18 Ll L Rep 319. A careful reading of the lengthy opinions of their Lordships in that case discloses that the question whether a provision in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier likewise limits the liability of its negligent agent, though the agent is neither a party to, nor an express beneficiary of, the bill of lading, was not involved in or decided by that case. Nor has any English case ever held that a bill of lading that expressly limits the liability of only the carrier nevertheless applies to, and limits the liability of, its negligent agent.

Under the common law as declared by this Court, the appellant was liable for all damages caused by its negligence unless exonerated therefrom, in whole or in part, by a constitutional rule of law. No statute has limited its liability, and it was not a party to, nor a beneficiary of, the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, and hence its liability was not limited by that contract. It follows that the appellant's common-law liability for damages caused by its negligence was in no way limited, and the judgment below so holding was correct, and must be affirmed.