Rosapesca SL (the plaintiff) claimed for damage to a cargo of frozen seafood and fish carried in a container from the port of Nouadhibou, Mauritania, to the port of Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Spain, by Boluda Lines SA (the defendant). At the destination, the container was not discharged in the area of reefer cargo but in the area of dry cargo for exportation. Hence, the container was not connected to a power outlet, resulting in the total loss of the cargo. The container was discharged on 4 April 2009 and delivered to the defendant on 20 April 2009. On 8 March 2010, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant claiming compensation for the damage and on 4 May 2010 filed a lawsuit. The bill of lading contained a paramount clause establishing as the applicable law, the Law of International Maritime Transport of 1949, which incorporates the Hague Rules as modified by the Brussels and London Protocols of 1968 and 1979 respectively (the Hague-Visby Rules with SDR Protocol).

The defendant argued the claim was time-barred as the lawsuit was brought after the one-year time limitation period. The first instance court rejected this defence but dismissed the plaintiff's claim because it was not proven that the defendant was responsible for the discharge operations. On appeal, the Provincial Court decided that the action was time-barred. The plaintiff recurred the decision in cassation before the Tribunal Supremo/Supreme Court (SC).

The plaintiff alleged that the damage occurred in a section of the transport (the land portion) that was not governed by the Hague-Visby Rules. Therefore, the time-bar period stated in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules was not applicable. This provision has been construed by the courts as establishing an expiration period (caducidad), which does not admit interruption. That makes ineffective the letter of claim of 8 March 2019. The plaintiff contended that the court should have applied the legislation governing carriage of goods by land, which allows the limitation period (precripción) to be interrupted by a letter.

Held: The SC stated that the discharge of cargo to an inappropriate port integrates the maritime portion of the carriage and is governed by the Hague-Visby Rules and the Law of International Maritime Transport of 1949. The Court of Appeal had affirmed that the nature of the period stated in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules is an expiration time which cannot be interrupted by a letter. The plaintiff did not challenge this assertion, but argued that the Hague-Visby Rules did not apply to this case because the damage occurred once the container was discharged in the port and not during the maritime phase of the carriage. The SC stated that the damage occurred because the carrier discharged the cargo in a dock not suitable for reefer containers. The decisive factor that produced the damage corresponds to the maritime phase of the transport as it occurred ‘during the time from the loading of the cargo until its discharge’, even though the damages appeared once the container was discharged. Therefore, the Hague-Visby Rules applied and the claim was time-barred. The cassation was dismissed.