In August 2004, CE's Najad 37 boat tore from its mooring in Saltsjöbaden and drifted into an empty jetty next to RR's Comfort 34 sailboat.

In January 2007, RR brought an action against CE asking that the District Court order CE to pay damages of SEK 59,500 plus interest. As a basis for the action, RR stated that CE's boat was insufficiently moored at the time of the damage. As a result, the boat tore from its place, drifted down next to RR's boat, and caused significant abrasion damage. Due to repair work, RR could not use his boat during the month of May 2005. The damage he suffered for the lack of use amounted to SEK 24,500, which was calculated in such a way that the amount was about half of what it would have cost to rent an equivalent boat during the period. In addition, the damage to the boat meant that the boat's value decreased by at least SEK 35,000. CE disputed the claim and submitted that RR's claim for damages was time-barred.

The District Court declared that RR's claim for damages against CE ceased as a result of prescription. RR appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal, which upheld the District Court judgment. RR appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: The decision of the Court of Appeal is upheld.

The provisions of the Maritime Code 1994 on prescription have been transferred from the Maritime Code 1891 without objective relevant changes (see Bill 1993/94:195 s 345). The provisions on the collision of ships are based on the Collision Convention 1910. They were incorporated into the Maritime Code 1891 through amendments to the law in 1913 (see NJA II 1913 s 191). The Convention concerns international maritime traffic and is applicable to collisions between ships. It covers damage to ships as well as goods and people on them and contains, among other things, rules on how responsibility is to be distributed, mainly according to the liability on each 'side', and presupposes such liability for each party's own negligence, a principle which has long been valid in Swedish law and which is now also expressed in s 1 of the Torts Act. According to art 7 of the Convention, the right to an action for damages ceases when two years have elapsed since the event occurred.

Following Nordic co-operation, a certain revision of the Maritime Code 1891 was made in connection with the Convention. Although the Convention concerned only relationships with other Convention States, the new rules were made universal (see NJA II 1913 s 191). In addition to the liability provisions in s 220 (now Ch 8, ss 1-4) which were amended, eg with regard to how to assess causation on each side (see NJA II 1913 s 201), art 7 caused the provisions on prescription in s 283 to be amended in the part that is now regulated in ch § 1 first para 3 of the Maritime Code. In the preparatory work, it was stated that the provision on short-term prescription had an absolute character and that it would apply to claims referred to in the Convention 'even in so far as they imply the right to adhere to the debtor personally' (see NJA II 1913 s 211). The intention of that change must therefore be considered to have been that the short limitation period would also apply if a injured party claimed that the shipowner itself - or someone else for whom the shipowner is responsible - had caused collision damage and claimed personal liability according to general tort law principles.

That the statute of limitations is intended to cover every claim covered by the Maritime Code, regardless of whether the basis of liability is attributable to explicit provisions in the Maritime Code or to general principles on damages due to negligence, is moreover expressed in the preparatory work for amendments to the Maritime Code 1891 regarding the carriage of goods and passengers by sea (see Bill 1973: 137 s 121).

In the light of the above, it is clear that the statute of limitations in ch § 1 first para 3 of the Maritime Code also encompasses a shipowner's negligence liability for the collision damage in question. RR's claim for damages is thus covered by that provision.

The limitation period according to ch § 1 first para 3 of the Maritime Code is two years, and is calculated according to the text of the law 'from the day the damage occurred'. In the French original version of the Collision Convention 1910, art 7 states that the limitation period is counted 'à partir de l'évènement', and according to the English wording, the period is counted 'from the date of the casualty'. Against this background, damage in this context must be understood to mean the damage to the ship occurs at the time of the collision, even if the economic consequences of that damage, eg missed hire, only occur later. More than two years had elapsed from the starting point for the limitation period when RR brought an action against CE. The time limit for bringing an action has thus expired.

RR also argued that CE's insurance company refrained from invoking the limitation period, or that the company granted an extension of the limitation period through statements in the correspondence that took place regarding the collision. A party may, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, allow an extension of the limitation period in the case of special prescription. The starting point is that a party can also refrain from invoking a statute of limitations, both before and after the limitation period has occurred. Both an extension consent and a waiver of prescription (of one kind or another) can be concluded. A recognition of liability for damages may, depending on the circumstances, be perceived in that way.

An insurance company that represents the person liable for damages can, like any other agent, make an extension or waiver binding on the person liable for damages. In order for an insurance company to be considered to represent the person liable for damages, however, it is required that the company has been commissioned to do so. Such an assignment may in some cases follow from the insurance terms (see NJA 2001 s 329). However, the fact that the tortfeasor consents to the insurance company engaging in a claims settlement procedure with the injured party is not, in itself, sufficient for such an assignment to be considered to exist. The issue to be examined in this case is limited to the significance that CE's insurance company's actions may have in terms of prescription with regard to RR's claim for damages against CE. The investigation in this case does not support the argument that the insurance company had such an assignment to represent CE that was able to bind CE. Regardless of what the insurance company can be considered to have expressed in relation to RR, it cannot therefore lead to CE's limitation objection failing.