The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit claiming the recovery of amounts paid by them, as insurers, for damage to the insured's goods during maritime transport. The defendant considered that the insurers' claim was time-barred. Nevertheless, the first instance Court rejected the time-bar defence filed by the defendant. In order to reach its decision the first instance Court considered that the notice requesting payment sent on 5 June 2007 and the notice sent to inform the defendant of the mediation hearing suspended the time bar.

The defendant appealed, because it considered that the time bar could not be suspended more than once.

Held: The Court of Appeals stated that the discussion was about an international contract of carriage of goods by sea in respect of which a bill of lading was issued. The Court added that it was not under discussion that the one-year time bar stated by the Brussels International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading 1924 (the Hague Rules) and art 293 of the Argentine Navigation Act (Nº 20.094) applies.

The Court stated that the time bar involved the loss or extinction of a right by the lack of execution during the period stated by law. In addition, it was mentioned that the time bar should be interpreted restrictively and, in case of doubt, the decision should be in favour of the subsistence of the plaintiffs' rights.

The notice to the debtor and the mediation are two different institutions with their own purposes, governed by separate Acts, with the only similarity of suspending the time bar. Furthermore, art 3986, second part, of the Civil Code (no longer in force) stated that the time bar might be suspended only once for one year by the formal request of payment to the debtor.

However, the time bar can be suspended again by additional means. Indeed, the mediation has consequences for the time bar (art 29 of Act 24573 in force at the relevant time) and suspended the time bar for one year, as stated in art 3986 of the Civil Code in force when the decision was passed.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the notice requesting payment and the filing of mediation proceedings are autonomous methods of suspension of the time bar. The differences between the notice of claim and the mediation proceedings justify that both can suspend the time bar.

The Court then considered whether the time bar had effect in the current case.

The time bar should be counted from the moment when the goods were unloaded (15 June 2006) and therefore the time bar should have taken effect on 15 June 2007 according to art 3.6 of the Hague Rules and art 293 of the Argentine Navigation Act Nº 20094.

The request of payment was sent on 5 June 2007, and therefore the time bar was suspended for one year. Before that one year elapsed, the plaintiff filed mediation proceedings and summoned the defendant for a hearing to take place on 14 February 2008. From the later date, the time bar of one year should be counted again. The time bar took effect on 14 February 2009, whereas the lawsuit was filed on 5 June 2009. Therefore, the Court of Appeals overruled the first instance Court's decision and stated that the claim was time-barred.