This was a salvage claim brought by SD Rebel BV, as owners of the tug VB Rebel, and the master, officers and crew of the tug. The defendant was Elise Tankschiffahrt KG, which was the owner of the inland waterways tanker MV Stela. On 14 November 2023, services were provided by the VB Rebel to the MV Stela at Scheurhaven, Port of Rotterdam. At the conclusion of the services, the Master of the Stela signed a 'Certificate of Safe Delivery' which stipulated that any dispute arising out of the provision of salvage services would 'be settled in London, in accordance with English law'. Notwithstanding that stipulation, on 24 January 2024, the defendant commenced proceedings in the Rotterdam District Court seeking a declaration that the services provided did not amount to salvage and, in the alternative, for the Dutch Court to determine the salvage award. To commence proceedings in Rotterdam was an apparent breach of the jurisdiction agreement in the Certificate of Safe Delivery. The claimants therefore issued these proceedings in England and, on 20 February 2024, applied for an anti-suit injunction.

On 21 March 2024, Andrew Baker J granted the claimants' application and ordered an interim anti-suit injunction against the defendant. The defendant has defied the anti-suit injunction, apparently on the basis that the jurisdiction agreement was not enforceable on the ground that it was 'too vague as it specified the jurisdiction as "London" rather than the English courts'.

Held: A final anti-suit injunction is ordered, and the claimants are awarded damages in the amount of the costs that they have expended by virtue of being forced to defend the Dutch proceedings brought in breach of the jurisdiction agreement and the interim anti-suit injunction. Those costs are presently EUR 25,283.95.

The defendant denied that the services provided by the claimants amounted to salvage. Whether services are salvage services is addressed in Kennedy & Rose on the Law of Salvage, 10th ed, para 5-004:

The test of whether there is sufficient danger to found a claim for salvage is essentially an objective one. The danger necessary to found a salvage service, however it arises, has been described as a real and sensible danger. On the one hand, it must not be either fanciful or only vaguely possible or have passed by the time the service is rendered. On the other hand, it is not necessary that distress should be actual or immediate or that the danger should be imminent; it will be sufficient if, at the time at which assistance is rendered, the subject matter has encountered any misfortune or likelihood of misfortune which might possibly expose it to loss or damage if the service were not rendered. The salvage claimant does not have to prove on the balance of probability that the danger would have materialised, only that the danger was one that was sufficiently likely to materialise to be worthy of being addressed. As Bucknill J put it with regard to life salvage in The Suevic, there must be danger or apprehension of danger. Thus, it is not necessary to shew that a stranded vessel would not or might not have got away before a reasonably apprehended peril became an actual danger; it is sufficient that she would not have come free without the services provided. The possibility of a danger’s becoming imminent, e.g. through mistake, misunderstanding or misapprehension, may be some evidence of danger. Indirect danger will not be sufficient. Thus, to salvage one ship from colliding with a second ship will not be a salvage service to the second ship if it could have avoided the collision. The fact that disaster would have become inevitable may be a ground for increasing the amount of a salvage award. Therefore, in order to warrant a salvage service, there must be such reasonable, present apprehension of danger that, in order to escape or avoid the danger, no reasonably prudent and skilful person in charge of the venture would refuse a salvor's help if it were offered to him upon the condition of his paying a salvage reward. The views of the master as to the existence of danger, if bona fide and reasonable, will be strong evidence that the danger was a real one. The court will be slow, with the benefit of hindsight, to find that the apprehension of danger was reasonably held but that the danger was in fact illusory. To reject a genuine and reasonable apprehension of danger as a basis for salvage would be to encourage a ship’s master to continue taking the risk of the believed danger rather than take prompt action to deal with it. In practice, debate as to whether a danger actually existed is commonly overcome if a salvage contract is concluded, so that the parties are estopped from denying that it is a salvage situation.

[Emphases added.]

Salvage claims are determined according to the Salvage Convention 1989, which has the force of law in the UK by virtue of s 224 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK). Article 13 of the Convention provides the criteria for fixing an award. Although the criteria and the principles are clear and well-established, the assessment of a salvage award in terms of money is not easy. The majority of awards, if not agreed, are assessed by a single arbitrator under the scheme provided for by agreements on Lloyd’s Open Form. Two cases have emphasised that it is proper to take such awards into account: see The Hamtun and St John [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 883, 899 where Mr Peter Gross QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, made reference to LOF awards because of a concern that 'the Court should not inadvertently decide on a level of salvage remuneration out of line with the correct bracket for analogous LOF awards', and see also the observation of David Steel J in The Owners of the Voutakos v Tsavliris Salvage (International) [2008] EWHC 1581 [9]-[10] (Admlty) – an appeal from a salvage award made pursuant to LOF – where he noted that because 'salvage claims are now very seldom determined in this court but are dealt with very efficiently under the auspices of LOF or contractual forms of a similar kind with limited scope for the court's intervention, LOF awards were, in practice, the main source of comparables.

The services here amounted to salvage. The situation was that the Stela was hard aground forward, its bow section was resting on boulders, and it was some 10 cm out of its marks. The tide had further to fall. Before a line was attached, it had pivoted approximately 18 degrees, thus presenting a risk of causing damage or further damage to its shell plating by 'working' on the boulders and a risk of obstructing Scheurhaven to its starboard side. There was also a risk of more structural damage, particularly as the tide was falling. It could not have extricated itself from this situation without assistance unless it embarked upon a deballasting exercise which would have taken time, which would not have guaranteed success and which would (as the experts acknowledged) still have required a tug to stand by to assist if necessary. Lastly, there is the fact that the master of the Stela signed a certificate containing an express acknowledgement that salvage services had been provided. His signature must be considered in the context that he had not 'waved off' the VB Rebel, which was a professional tug providing towage and salvage services. On the contrary, he had accepted a line. In these circumstances, the test set out above is made out.

Turning to the specific criteria:

(a) The salved value of the vessel and other property. The total salved fund was approximately EUR 2,346,427 - a relatively modest fund. In percentage terms that divides up as to 76.71% attributable to the vessel and 23.29% attributable to the cargo.

(b) the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimising damage to the environment. The vessel was laden with a dangerous, flammable cargo capable of causing very considerable environmental damage.

(c) The service was successful. The vessel was refloated without damage and returned to berth.

(d) The nature and degree of the danger. There was a danger of the vessel sustaining damage to its shell plating if it had 'worked' against the boulders upon which it was grounded.

(e) The skill and efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and life. The services were professional and well-performed. But it was a very simple operation.

(f) The time used and expenses and losses incurred by the salvors. The timeframe was around 45 minutes. Looked at in the context of salvage claims generally, that is a very short timeframe. The claimants put forward no particular expenses or losses.

(g) The risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or their equipment. None in particular was put forward.

(h) The promptness of the services rendered. The services were practically immediate. The tug identified the unfolding situation from radio exchanges and arrived only minutes after the vessel had gone aground.

(i) The availability and use of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations. The tug and the equipment used were immediately available. This was a single tug using no specialist salvage equipment.

(j) The state of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment and the value thereof. The equipment was immediately ready, available, and efficient.

Fixing a salvage award is a single, impressionistic exercise taking into account all of the above factors. Here, although the duration of the salvage services was short and it was a simple operation, those services were performed with exemplary speed and professionalism and they averted dangers both to the vessel and to the port. They therefore conferred a significant benefit. There is also the principle of encouragement which features large in this, or any, salvage award. Balancing these factors, a proper award is GBP 90,000, of which the proportion attributable to this defendant is 76.71%, ie GBP 69,039.