On 20 May 1978 there was a collision on the Singapore River between a motor sampan owned by the second defendant and a bumboat owned by one of the plaintiffs. The bumboat was under the control of Tay Kian Ho (TKH) who died in the collision. The plaintiffs claimed damages on behalf of TKH’s dependants and on behalf of TKH’s estate.
The writ was issued on 30 April 1981, just short of three years after the collision. The defendants, in their statement of defence, denied negligence and claimed the collision was caused solely by, or contributed to, by TKH. A number of directions were given and a trial date was fixed for 4 August 1988. On 20 July 1988, the solicitors for the defendants applied to discharge themselves on the ground of inability to trace the defendants. On 26 July 1988, the solicitors for the defendants took out further directions to amend the defence to add the defence of limitation based on s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (MCA 1911) which would have barred the action two years after the date of the collision. The Assistant Registrar gave leave to amend the defence. Immediately after the defendants were given leave to amend their defence, the plaintiffs’ solicitor took out a motion for an order to try the issue of whether s 8 of the MCA 1911 applied to the action, and if it did, for an order that the limitation period be extended.
The plaintiffs appealed the Assistant Registrar’s decision allowing the addition of the defence of limitation. AP Rajah J allowed the appeal and the defendants appealed that decision.
Chao Hick Tin JC heard the application regarding s 8 of the MCA 1911 (see CMI196). He held that s 8 did apply to the action and refused leave to extend time. The plaintiffs appealed that decision.
As the two appeals raised related issues of law on the same facts the Court of Appeal heard both immediately after the other and gave judgment together.
Held: The defendants’ appeal is dismissed. The plaintiffs would be prejudiced were the defendants granted leave to amend their defence at this stage. The plaintiffs’ solicitors were negligent in commencing a time-barred claim and whatever claim the plaintiffs had against their solicitors for negligence was also time barred.
As the defendants were not permitted to add the defence of limitation, it was not necessary to decide the plaintiffs’ appeal. However, the Court of Appeal clarified the application of the MCA 1911 and its relationship to the Collision Convention 1910.
The MCA 1911 is Imperial legislation enacted by the United Kingdom Parliament. It came into force on 16 December 1911 and on 1 February 1913 its application was extended to the Straits Settlement. When Singapore became independent as a constituent State of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 and then as a sovereign Republic on 9 August 1965, the MCA 1911 continued as part of the law of Singapore. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the MCA 1911 does not apply to common law negligence actions but only admiralty actions in rem or in personam. This is incorrect. The MCA 1911 applies to all actions, whether brought as admiralty or common law actions. Section 9(3) states that it applies to all cases in any court having jurisdiction to deal with the case and in whatever waters the damage or loss in question occurred.
Counsel for the plaintiffs also submitted that the MCA 1911 only applies to collisions between sea-going vessels or sea-going vessels and inland waterway vessels, as that is the ambit of the Collision Convention 1910 pursuant to which the MCA 1911 was enacted.
Article 1 of the Collision Convention 1910 provides that, where a collision takes place between sea-going vessels and vessels of inland navigation, the compensation for damages shall be settled in accordance with the provisions in art 4 which concerns apportionment of liability. Article 12 provides that where all persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case, the provisions of the national law and not of the Convention are applicable.
Therefore the Collision Convention 1910 does not apply to collisions between vessels of inland navigation which are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of each State. This does not mean that the MCA 1911 is in conflict with the Collision Convention 1910. The MCA 1911 applies to collisions between motor boats whether or not they are sea-going vessels and this simply means that the scope of the MCA 1911 is wider than that of the Collision Convention 1910.
The Singapore River was and is a place for navigation and the two motor boats were being used in navigation at the time of the collision. Therefore s 8 of the MCA 1911 applies to the action and the plaintiffs’ cause of action was time barred two years after the date of the collision. As the defendants’ appeal is dismissed it is not necessary to decide whether the limitation period should be extended.