The plaintiffs served on board the MS Sveafjell while the ship was owned by Hammerfest Kysttransport AS. Shintiakov, Afansiev and Moisev arrested the ship by order of the Sunnmøre District Court on 26 February 2009 for outstanding wages claims totaling NOK 300,000, while Sørheim, Samuelsen and Syrstad arrested the ship on 25 May 2009 for outstanding wages claims totaling NOK 950,000. The arrest warrants were not registered in the ship register, but were immediately served on board by the Sheriff in Sula.

Between the issuing of the two arrest warrants, Hammerfest Kysttransport AS declared insolvency. In December 2009, the company abandoned the ship in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act § 117(b). On 21 January 2010, the arresters lodged a settlement complaint with the Sula Conciliation Board against Hammerfest Kysttransport AS and its insolvent estate, claiming enforcement of the wages claims. The insolvent estate accordingly accepted the plaintiffs' claims, and on this basis, the conciliation council on 24 March 2010 handed down an enforcement judgment for the plaintiffs' wages claims.

When Hammerfest Kysttransport AS was declared insolvent, MS Sveafjell was being repaired by Vegsund Slip AS in Eidsnes. The ship repairer invoked a right of retention over the ship for its claim: see § 54 of the Maritime Code. With uncontested invoices as a coercive basis, Vegsund Slip AS received a judgment against the ship for its claim by decision of the Sheriff in Sula on 6 January 2011: see § 7-2(f) of the Enforcement Act. The ship repairer's claim in the disbursement is estimated at NOK 2,077,555. At the request of Vegsund Slip AS, the ship was forcibly sold at Sunnmøre District Court. By ruling on 28 September 2011, the District Court upheld a bid of NOK 750,000.

In connection with the distribution of the sale proceeds, a dispute arose between Vegsund Slip AS and the six arresters. The arresters claimed that their wages claims were secured by a maritime lien that ranked before the ship repairer's disbursement: see the Maritime Code §§ 52 and 54; see the Enforcement Act § 7-16. In a distribution ruling on 13 October 2011, the District Court ruled without any further justification that the wage claims were not obsolete, and as a result Vegsund Slip AS did not receive coverage for any part of its claim.

Following an appeal, the District Court's ruling was revoked by the Frostating Court of Appeal's ruling on 25 January 2012 due to a lack of justification. On 10 August 2012, the District Court handed down a new ruling in which the result from the first ruling was upheld. The District Court ruled that the arresters' maritime lien claims were not statute-barred, as the arrest had been made within one year of the claims arising: see § 55(1) of the Maritime Code. The District Court found no basis for setting a deadline for the arresters to request a forced sale after they had arrested the ship for their claims.

Vegsund Slip AS appealed the District Court's ruling to the Frostating Court of Appeal, which on 26 February 2013 revoked the District Court's decision. The seafarers then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

The Court of Appeal's ruling is based on two grounds. In principle, the Court of Appeal relied on the fact that according to the Maritime Code § 55(1) it is necessary to prevent the limitation of a maritime lien by applying for a forced sale 'as soon as possible after arrest has been executed'. In the alternative, the Court of Appeal relied on the fact that the arrest lapsed pursuant to the Disputes Act § 33-10(1)(f) when the arresters did not request enforcement within one month after the Sula Conciliation Board's judgment of 24 March 2010 became final.

The Maritime Code of 1994 § 55(1) reads: 'Maritime liens expire within 1 year from the day when the claim in question arose, unless the ship is arrested before the deadline and the arrest leads to forced sale. The ship is considered arrested when the arrest decision has been served on board or otherwise implemented on board.' This provision was historically based on the International Convention on the Introduction of Certain Uniform Rules on Maritime Liens and Mortgages 1967. In the Convention, the limitation period of a maritime lien is governed by art 8, which reads: 'The maritime liens set out in Article 4 shall be extinguished after a period of one year from the time when the claims secured thereby arose unless, prior to the expiry of such period, the vessel has been arrested, such arrest leading to a forced sale'.

The MLM Convention 1967 was not ratified by Norway, but the amendment to the law in 1972, which was prepared by the Maritime Law Committee, was nevertheless based on the Convention. The Committee's report did not explicitly discuss whether requirements should be set for activity after an arrest has been made. However, the Committee implicitly addressed this in considering the question of when a ship should be considered to have been arrested. Recommendation VIII from the Maritime Law Committee, 1969, p 78 states: 'As the time limit can only be interrupted by arrest, it will matter from what time the ship is to be considered arrested. It is assumed that it would be inconsistent with the Convention if the time was already set. It must be required that it has in some way been physically effected in relation to the ship, and it has therefore been stated in the draft that the ship is considered arrested when the arrest decision has been served on board or implemented on board in another way. ...'

The limitation period for maritime liens is shorter than normal limitation periods. Clear evidence should therefore be required to interpret an activity requirement in order for an arrest to retain its suspensive effect. No activity requirement can be deduced from the expression 'the arrest leads to forced sale' in the Maritime Code § 55(1). On the basis of the preparatory work, nothing more can be added to this wording than that the arrest must be in existence when forced sale is requested. The appellant ship repairer has, as support for interpreting an activity requirement in the Maritime Code § 55(1), referred to the Mortgage Act § 6-3. According to this provision, the statutory mortgage lapses 'if no later than two years after the mortgage claim should have been paid, applications are received by the registration authority for compulsory coverage, or if coverage is not carried out without undue delay'. As the limitation period of a ship mortgage is regulated by a special rule in the Maritime Code § 55, the Mortgage Act § 6-3 does not apply to a ship mortgage. Section 6-3 of the Mortgage Act also makes no contribution to the understanding of the Maritime Code § 55(1). It appears from the context that the alternative wording 'if coverage is not carried out without unnecessary delay' in the Mortgage Act § 6-3 aims at the time after the cover request has been submitted. There is thus no basis for interpreting any activity requirement in the Maritime Code § 55(1). The Court of Appeal's principal basis for its decision is thus based on an incorrect interpretation of this provision.

The next question is how the Dispute Act § 33-10(1)(f) is to be understood. When the Maritime Code was amended in 1972, the general rules on arrest were in the Enforcement Act 1915, Part 14. When Norway enacted a new Enforcement Act in 1992, the one-year rule in the previous Enforcement Act § 255 was replaced by the provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1992 § 14-15(c) and (f). These provisions are now found in the Dispute Act § 33-10(1)(c) and (f). It appears from the Dispute Act § 33-4(2) that the court in its decision on arrest or in a later decision on the defendant's request shall set a deadline for the plaintiff to sue for the claim, or to request enforcement if the plaintiff already has coercive grounds for its claim. Lapse of arrest is regulated by § 33-10(1). This provision stipulates: 'The arrest lapses without annulment: a) when the plaintiff's claim is seized in the arrested property; b) when the plaintiff is given a deadline to provide security or to sue or request enforcement of the claim, and the time limit is exceeded; c) when no time limit has been set for legal action or application for enforcement, and legal action has not been brought or enforcement has been requested one year after the issuance of the arrest warrant, the arrest lapses after one year from the delivery of the arrest warrant. …'

Coverage for wages claims can be obtained in two ways. The first is for the seafarer to receive a judgment for the claim and for the ship to be put up for forced sale. The second is that the seafarer receives a judgment for the claim and requests disbursement. Pursuant to the Dispute Act § 33-10(1)(a), the arrest lapses if an attachment is made for a claim that is secured by arrest. When an attachment is made for a claim liable to a maritime lien, however, the attachment takes the place of the lien and is given the same priority as the lien previously had. The fact that the arrest lapses upon disbursement therefore does not cause the seafarer to lose his or her priority.

In the conciliation appeal to the Sula Conciliation Board, the arresters did not demand a judgment for the right to put the ship up for forced sale, but contented themselves with demanding an enforcement judgment for the wages claims. The Conciliation Council's judgment of 24 March 2010 therefore does not provide a basis for coverage. In order for the detainees to be able to claim compulsory coverage after this judgment, they must therefore first have obtained a disbursement. When the seafarers arrested the ship for their claims, no time limit was set for bringing an action. Pursuant to the Dispute Act § 33-10(1)(c), they then had a period of one year after the service of the arrest warrants to bring an action. They have complied with this deadline. If the arresters in the case before the Sula Conciliation Board had not only demanded an enforcement judgment, but also a judgment for the right to put the ship up for forced sale, a possible deadline for requesting a forced sale must have been set pursuant to the Dispute Act § 33-4(2). As previously pointed out, however, the arresters chose only to demand enforcement of their wages claims. From when the conciliation council's judgment became final, according to § 33-10(1)(f) they were given a deadline of one month to request disbursement. When this deadline was exceeded, the arrest lapsed, and when more than a year passed since the claims arose, the maritime lien also became obsolete. The Court of Appeal has thus interpreted § 33-10(1)(f) correctly when in its subsidiary decision basis it assumed that the arrest lapsed when disbursement was not requested within one month after the conciliation council's judgment became final. On this basis, the appeal must be rejected.