The plaintiff entered into a contract for service on the Columbus Caravelle with the defendants' predecessor. That predecessor came into possession of the vessel under a bareboat charterparty, which the defendants had taken over under an assignment. The plaintiff's service was terminated by the defendants in October 1995. The plaintiff sued for, among other things, unpaid wages. Parties disagreed over whether the plaintiff was a 'master'. The contract stated:

CONTRACT FOR SERVICE ON BOARD M.V. COLUMBUS CARVELLE

This contract for service agreement is made on the 12th March 1995 between MOZZEN LTD, CHARTERER of M.V. COLUMBUS CARAVELLE and MR. ALAN SOH […] to manage and operate the said vessel on the terms and condition stated below.

1. POSITION : Chief Executive Officer …

The defendants applied to strike out the plaintiff's claim because the claim did not fall under s 20 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) (SCA 1981) and consequently the Court lacked jurisdiction. The defendants' application was dismissed at first instance. They appealed and argued that the plaintiff was neither master nor crew, and that the plaintiff's name did not appear in the crew list.

The plaintiff cited The Queen v The Judge of the City of London Court (1890) 25 QBD 339 (The SS Michigan) to rebut the defendants' argument about the crew list. The plaintiff claimed to be employed as the master of the vessel save that he was called the chief executive officer (CEO). The plaintiff's affidavit stated:

4. My duties on board the said Ship until the date of termination involves, in part, making decisions concerning the voyage schedule of the said Ship; making decisions on the said Ship's arrival and departure time; making decisions to purchase engine parts and to oversee the repair and regular maintenance of the said Ship; making arrangement with port authorities, foreign or otherwise, before calling at any port, making decisions to hire and/or fire crew members; making recommendation for provisions for the maintenance of the crew members and passengers on board the said Ship; and generally to ensure the Ship's smooth operation.

5. While working on board the said Ship I was allotted a permanent suite on board the ship for my exclusive use as accommodation cum office. I was paid my wages on board the said Ship at the end of each month.

6. It was the understanding between the board of directors of Messrs. Fiaco International Limited and myself that my name should not be included in the crew list due to the nature of the said Ship's operation as a daily cruiser liner. Each member of the crew whose name appears on the crew list will need to sign off from the said vessel if he needs to travel on foreign land and this normally takes 12 to 24 hours to obtain clearance from the port authority. It was due to the inconvenience of travelling that my name was not registered in the crew list and this was done with the full knowledge and consent of the board of directors of Messrs. Fiaco International Limited.

The plaintiff argued that the duties performed by the plaintiff on the vessel fell within the definition of 'master' in s 24(1) of the SCA 1981:

'Master' has the same meaning as in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, and accordingly includes every person (except a pilot) having command or charge of a ship.

In response, the defendants cited the US District Court case of The Dubuque (1870) 36 British Maritime Cases 466 (also reported as 7 F Cas 1141 (ED Mich)) for the proposition that the registry is conclusive evidence on the question of who the master of the vessel is. The defendants did not file any affidavit challenging the evidence given in the plaintiff's affidavit. The defendants argued that the plaintiff cannot be a master because: the plaintiff did not possess a certificate of competency; the plaintiff did not sign the crew list as master; and the master was already provided by the owner of the vessel. Furthermore, the crew agreement was not produced to support the plaintiff's assertion of a right to hire and fire crew members.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

It was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff was not the 'master' of the vessel. The definition of 'master' in s 24(1) of the SCA 1981 is sufficiently broad to include the plaintiff's position as CEO. On the evidence, the plaintiff was the master as he was in command of the ship. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction. One jurisdiction of the Court is that relating to admiralty as exercised by the High Court of Justice in England under the SCA 1981 (see s 24(b) of Malaysia's Courts of Judicature Act 1964). Under ss 20(1)(a) and 20(2)(o) of the SCA 1981, such admiralty jurisdiction includes 'any claim by a master or member of the crew of a ship for wages (including any sum allotted out of wages or adjudged by a superintendent to be due by way of wages)'.

The defendants' argument about the certificate of competency was rejected. Whether the plaintiff possessed a certificate of competency was irrelevant insofar as his status as master of the ship was concerned. Possession of that certificate is not an element in the definition of master.

The defendants' argument about the crew list was rejected. The absence of an article showing a person to be a member of the crew did not prevent the person from claiming to be a member of the crew: The SS Michigan. The same could be said of a person whose name does not appear in the crew list as a master. It did not prevent the person from claiming to have performed the duties of a master. The Dubuque can be distinguished because that decision was based on the laws of the registry in that case, whereas there is no law decreeing the finality of a ship's crew list in this case.

The defendants' argument that the master was already provided by the owner of the vessel was rejected. This did not prevent the plaintiff from performing the same or similar function to qualify as a master.

The defendants' argument that no document had been produced to show that the plaintiff had been given authority to fire crew members was rejected. This was not decisive of whether the plaintiff qualifies as a master.