LPL Projects Logistics Spain SL (LPL) filed a lawsuit against Stejasa Agregados Industriales SA (Stejasa), claiming EUR 32,481 as part of the freight for carriage of goods by sea from Vietnam to Gijón, Spain. Stejasa counterclaimed for EUR 641,699.90 as compensation for damage to its cargo. After noting that the cargo was carried under a bill of lading, subject to the Hague-Visby Rules and the Law on Maritime Navigation (LNM), the Court of first instance said:

It is impossible to define with crystal clarity which part of the damage can be attributed to a breach by the carrier [LPL] of its obligations and which part is attributable to an inherent defect that the cargo already presented and that could be aggravated by its deficient packaging (crates, plastics, tarpaulins ...) as well as storage on deck, which the shipper [Stejasa] knew and consented to. The expert report provided by the counterclaimant, when it describes the damage suffered by the goods and their economic valuation, includes a global item of 'replacement of lagging with corrosion, oxidation and knocks'; whereas, in a case like this, it would be necessary to refine much more to be able to determine what type of corrosion and oxidation each package presented (fresh water, salt water, or both) and what type of impact each piece had (attributable to poor protection in stacking or to incorrect lashing).

The first instance Court therefore upheld LPL's claim, but dismissed Stejasa's counterclaim. Stejasa appealed, arguing that there was no perceptible damage to the goods prior to transportation, and if there were, it would have been caused by the negligence and responsibility of the carrier, due to the failure to make available to the shipper a suitable ship on the agreed date, and to undertake and carry out the journey promptly and without delay. The cargo should have arrived in exactly the same condition in which it was delivered, ie, with light scratches and oxidation due to rainwater, and not as it arrived, in a condition of ruin, with crushing, denting, severe corrosion, and oxidation by sea water. LPL argued on appeal that the decision of the Court of first instance should be upheld, and additionally, that Stejasa's claim against it had prescribed, arguing that the Court should have ruled on this point.

Held: The judgment appealed from is confirmed, albeit for different reasons.

It is uncontroversial that this case involves an international maritime transport relationship under the bill of lading regime, regulated by what are known as the Hague-Visby Rules, incorporated into Ch II of Title IV of Law 14/2014, of 24 July, on Maritime Navigation. Article 277.2 LNM provides:

Contracts for the maritime transport of goods, national or international, under the bill of lading system and the responsibility of the carrier, shall be governed by the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Regarding Bills of Lading, signed in Brussels on 25 August 1924, the Protocols that modify it to which Spain is a State Party, and this law.

As explained in the Preamble to the LNM, the broad reform of Spanish maritime law in 2014 does not seek a mere updating and codification, but also responds to its essential co-ordination with international maritime law and its adaptation to the current practices of maritime transport. What is sought is to overcome existing contradictions between the different international agreements in force in Spain and the scattered regulations that previously regulated this matter. The aim for uniformity entails the purpose of putting an end to the duality of regulations existing in many areas of this matter (both international regulations contained in agreements ratified by Spain and national regulations), which explains the legislative technique used, based on the reference to the Conventions in force in each matter.

It is settled in the jurisprudence that the limitation period that applies to the exercise of an action of one year set out in art. 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules leads to the expiration of the cause of action:

This criterion on the expiration of the term has been maintained in many decisions (among others, STS of 11 March 1987 and 18 September 1988) and the rigor of the term is based on the need to provide the system of maritime transport claims with a specific and unchangeable period in which the actions derived from the transport can be exercised, so that the carrier (or the freight forwarder, as the case may be) is not exposed to untimely claims, formulated long after the transport. The only possibility that allows the modification of said period is that both parties agree that it be extended after the event that gave rise to the action (art 3.6 of the Brussels Convention).

Therefore, as long as the existence of an agreement to extend the term is not proven, once the one-year term has elapsed, the action expires. And this is without admitting interruption, because, unlike prescription, expiration protects a general interest linked to the requirement of certainty of legal relations. The fact that art 286 LNM establishes that actions arising from a charterparty will prescribe within one year should not modify the aforementioned conclusion.

In this case, LPL invokes the late exercise of the claim by Stejasa, but clothes its argument in prescription terms, instead of expiration of the action. Despite this, courts must resolve the issue in accordance with the applicable regulations, even if they have not been correctly cited or alleged by litigants. If the arrival of the cargo at Gijón took place on 17 June 2015, and Stejasa's counterclaim was brought in May 2018, it is evident that the one-year limitation term is exceeded in excess, so that Stejasa's action for compensation for cargo damage is extinguished, without it being necessary to analyse whether the meeting between the parties in June 2016 interrupted prescription. It is equally unnecessary to verify if the Court of first instance erred in its evaluation of the evidence on the existence of damage attributable to the carrier.