This was an action by the personal representatives of Tay Kian Ho, deceased, claiming damages on behalf of the estate and the widow and children of the deceased under s 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43) arising out of a collision along the Singapore river between tongkang SC-542A and motor lighter SA-54D on 24 May 1978.

The action was to be based on the negligence of the first defendant in steering the tongkang. The first defendant was in turn alleged to be the servant or agent of the second defendant, the owner of the tongkang. The deceased was the steersman of the motor lighter.

The writ was issued on 30 April 1981. The writ and statement of claim were served on the first and second defendants in March 1982. The action was set down for trial in September 1984. In December 1987 the case was fixed for hearing in August 1988.

Nine days before the date of the hearing, the defendants applied for, and were given, permission to amend their defence to include the additional ground that the action was time barred by reason of s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911. The plaintiffs applied to the court for certain preliminary questions to be decided.

The Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (the Act) was intended to give effect to the Collision and Salvage Conventions of 1910. At the time, Singapore was a colony. By the signature and ratification of the United Kingdom, the two Conventions were extended to Singapore. On Singapore becoming an independent state in 1965, Singapore informed the depositary state of the conventions that it accepted the Conventions.

Article 1 of the Collision Convention 1910 provides: ‘Where a collision occurs between sea-going vessels or between sea-going vessels and vessels of inland navigation the compensation due … shall be settled in accordance with the following provisions in whatever waters the collision takes place.’

Art 12 of the Collision Convention stipulates that ‘Where all persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case, the provisions of the national law and not of the Convention are applicable.’

The plaintiffs pointed out that, as in the present case the collision was not between two sea-going vessels or between a sea going vessel and a vessel of inland navigation, the Convention did not apply. They contended that, since the Act was enacted to give effect to the Convention, it should be interpreted in line with the Convention. They also argued that the Act should not apply to a case where both parties are Singaporeans, the vessels are Singapore inland craft and the collision occurred in the Singapore river.

Held: The Maritime Conventions Act 1911 applied to Singapore in 1911. The Court’s attention was not drawn to any subsequent Act of the United Kingdom (until 1963) or of Singapore which repealed the Act in so far as its application to Singapore was concerned. Accordingly, the Act was still part of Singapore law.

Section 1(1) of the Maritime Conventions Act provides that ‘where by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those vessels…’. Section 2(1) simply refers to ‘any person’ and ‘vessel’ without any qualification. The plaintiffs’ argument amounts to asking the court to qualify the word ‘vessels’ to mean that at least one of them must be a sea-going vessel and the expression ‘any person’ to mean one of the parties must be a citizen of another country. Chao JC held that there was no justification for making any such qualifications.

The Court found that Parliament had widened the scope of the Act to cover its own nationals and its own inland watercraft such that the Act was wider in scope than the Convention (the legislature was entitled to do as such). Although Chao JC accepted that it was a principle of legal policy than an Act should be interpreted to conform with international law, there was nothing here in conflict between the Act and the Convention. The Court accordingly held that the Act applied to the present case.

Chao JC also held that s 8 of the Act (containing the 2 year time bar from the date when the damage or loss or injury was caused) was not limited to admiralty actions; it applied to the present common law action in negligence arising out of a collision at sea, coupled with a dependency claim. As such, the present action was commenced too late and was out of time.

The Court then went on to consider the principles that govern the granting of an extension of time under s 8 of the Act, holding that the ‘substantial grounds’ or ‘special reasons’ must relate to the circumstances why a writ was issued late. There must be some good reasons to explain the delay justifying the court in exercising its discretion under s 8 to extend time.

The fact that there were pending negotiations between the parties could not per se amount to a good or substantial ground to grant an extension under s 8. There had to be something more in the nature of either an express or implied inducement by the defendants or their insurers to the plaintiffs to withhold any further action.

In the present case, nothing in the delay in the institution of the writ could be attributed to the defendants or their insurers. By contrast, there appeared to be dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiffs and/or their solicitors. There was really no explanation why the writ was not issued within the 2 year period.

The Court found that the plaintiffs and the insurers, as well as their respective solicitors, had overlooked the 2 year limitation period under the Act. But ignorance or oversight on the part of the parties or their solicitors cannot render the law any less applicable to the present case.

For the reasons mentioned, although Chao JC’s sympathies may have been with the plaintiffs, a case had not been made out to enable the court to exercise discretion in the plaintiffs’ favour, and the preliminary questions would be answered accordingly.