The respondent, Compañía Trasmediterránea SA (CT), chartered the Sorrento from Grimaldi Euromed SpA (Grimaldi), which was in charge of the nautical management of the vessel. Mosca Marítimo SL contracted with CT, in its own name and in its capacity as shipper and consignee, for the carriage of several vehicles owned by the appellant Transteco SA (Transteco), on the Sorrento from Palma de Mallorca to Valencia. The vehicles were completely destroyed in transit on 28 April 2015 due to a fire which broke out on the ship.

Transteco sued CT for damages of EUR 231,157.13. The Court of first instance found in favour of CT. Tranteco appealed to the Provincial Court. Transteco argued that the Court of first instance failed to give reasons for its judgment, was arbitrary in its lack of assessment of the evidence, and erred in assessing the evidence. Transteco argued that the fire occurred as a result of poor maintenance of the ship's electrical installations, as well as negligent actions by CT, which prevented the application of the fire exemption in art 4.2.b of the Hague-Visby Rules.

CT argued that Transteco lacked legal standing to sue in respect of some of the vehicles; that Transteco's claim had expired due to the fact that it was brought more than one year after the fire on the ship; and that CT was entitled on rely on the fire exemption in art 4.2.b of the Hague-Visby Rules. In the alternative, if it was considered that the fire has been caused by the act or fault of the carrier, Transteco's compensation was limited by the package limitation provided in the aforementioned Rules, in accordance with art 282.1 of Law 14/2014 on Maritime Navigation (the LNM).

Held: Transteco's appeal is allowed in part. The judgment issued on 17 February 2020 in ordinary trial no 39/2017 handed down by the Mercantile Court No 2 of Madrid lacked adequate reasoning. However, the substantive claim filed by Transteco is dismissed.

This is a case of domestic maritime transport of goods subject to the LNM. Grimaldi (which is not a party to this lawsuit) is considered to be the actual carrier in its capacity as the owner of the carrying vessel (art 278.3 LNM). TC is considered to be the charterer and contractual carrier, having accepted the transport of Transteco's vehicles on the Sorrento, and having signed the corresponding bill of lading with the shipper, Mosca Marítimo SL (art 207 LNM). According to arts 207 and 278.1 and 278.4 LNM, the liability of the contractual and actual carrier is joint and several against third parties for damages and delays of the transported goods, without prejudice to the rights of recourse that exist between them. The responsibility of the carrier in the maritime transport of goods under the bill of lading system is subject to the provisions of the Hague Rules, as modified by the Protocols of Brussels of 23 February 1968 and London of 21 December 1979, ratified by Spain on 16 November 1981 (the Hague-Visby Rules), not only in the case of international transport, but also domestic transport (art 277.2 LNM).

TC argues that it is not the contractual or actual carrier with respect to the plaintiff, alleging that its status is confined to that of the charterer of the ship. This argument is not admissable, and is inconsistent with TC's defence, which is based on the absence of its liability as the loss occurred as a result of a fire, unless its negligence is proven. TC's arguments regarding Transteco's lack of legal standing and limitation of Transteco's action are also excluded from this appeal, since no mention is now made of these arguments in the opposition to the appeal. In particular, with regard to expiration of the claim due to the limitation period, it may be inferred that the judgment of the Court of first instance rejected this argument, and by not expressly challenging this finding, this Court must conclude that TC agrees to this.

This claim is the twin of another matter that gave rise to ordinary trial no 166/2017 heard by the Commercial Court no 6 of Madrid, regarding the same fire on the same ship, in which the arguments of the parties and the evidence presented were identical. This litigation was resolved by a judgment of this Court of 9 July 2021, in which this Court held in favour of TC. This precedent, in the interests of legal certainty and coherence, constitutes this Court's starting point for the following discussion.

Transteco's complaint about the Court of first instance's lack of reasoning is justified. The judgment is limited to reproducing a judgment from another judicial body (see Generali España SA de Seguros y Reaseguros v Compañia Trasmediterránea SA SAP IB 168/2021 (CMI1704)), and a brief mention of a report from the Civil Guard. Nothing more. Motivation by referral is admissible, but the technique used by the Court of first instance does not meet constitutional requirements, and it is evident that this approach is not advisable, since it seems to place this Court in the position of a reviewer of the judgment of the Court of Palma de Mallorca.

This Court is obliged to make up for that omission, and will proceed to give a reasoned response in law. This Court refers to our earlier judgment of 9 July 2021, since it is not only the same incident, but, as Transteco itself acknowledges, is identical to the present proceddings, both in its allegations and in the essential evidence (a report prepared by the Civil Guard on the occasion of the accident; a report prepared by the Permanent Commission for the Investigation of Maritime Accidents of the General Directorate of Railway and Marine Investigations of the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, and the expert opinions of both parties), so that, since these have already been assessed by this Court, in this case it is justified that we refer to our previous conclusions.

The thesis of Transteco's appeal is that there was an error in the evaluation of the evidence, because the judgment was based on a single document, without evaluating it and putting it in relation to the rest of the evidence submitted in the proceedings. Transteco adds that this evidence reveals that: (a) the origin and cause of the fire was the result of poor maintenance of the ship's electrical installations; and (b) there was negligence on the part of TC in extinguishing the fire. As a result, Transteco considers that the fire exemption is not applicable.

The argument regarding the cause of the fire must be ruled out, because 'from the report of the Civil Guard it appears that, despite its detailed study, it was not possible to identify the specific determining cause of the fire beyond indicating that its etiology was accidental and that everything indicates that its origin was electrical, without being able to specify whether it is attributable to the refrigeration connection system of the trailer of one of the transported trucks - which would be unrelated to the defendant [TC] - or to the ship's electrical connection line (pp 99 and 100).'

This Court further relies on the report prepared by the Permanent Commission for the Investigation of Maritime Accidents (CIAIM) of the General Directorate of Railway and Marine Investigations of the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, which indicated that there was no evidence that the stowage of the vehicles did not comply with any regulations that determine the responsibility of the carrier.

Finally, the evidence does not demonstrate negligence in respect of the crew's firefighting operations, or in the master's decision to change course after the fire broke out. Even if the latter decision were negligent, we would be dealing with a nautical manoeuvre attributable only to the action of the master, not the carrier, without the ability to undermine the application of the exemption from liability for fire provided for in art 4.2.b of the Hague-Visby Rules. From the recommendations made in the report published by the Italian Maritime Accident Investigation Commission, the existence of negligent practices causally linked to the losses and damage claimed here cannot be inferred.

For all of the above reasons, it is appropriate to dismiss Transteco's appeal, since it has not been proven that the fire was caused by the carrier's act or fault; an absence of responsibility which means that determination and quantification of the damage is unnecessary.