Lex Warner chartered the M/V Jean Elaine, a motor vessel operated by Scapa Flow Charters (SFC), for a week. He died while diving. Warner's widow, Debbie Warner, sued SFC, alleging that her husband's death was the result of SFC's negligence. She sought damages both as an individual and as guardian of their young son, Vincent.

SFC argued that her action was time-barred under art 16 of the Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (Athens Convention 1974) which, in the case of a death occurring during carriage, imposes a time bar of two years from the date on which the passenger would have disembarked. It was agreed that Mr Warner would have disembarked no later than 18 August 2012 and that the Athens Convention 1974 applied to the circumstances of the accident.

The Lord Ordinary, having heard argument from both parties, upheld the time-bar defence in the Outer House of the Court of Session: see CMI124. Mrs Warner appealed by reclaiming motion to the Inner House. The Inner House upheld the Lord Ordinary's opinion in relation to her claim as an individual, but reversed his order in relation to her claim on behalf of her son, finding that her claim as guardian of her son was not time-barred: see CMI385. SFC appealed to the Supreme Court. Warner did not appeal the dismissal of her claim as an individual.

SFC argued that:

1. the natural meaning of the words 'grounds of suspension and interruption of limitation periods' in art 16.3 of the Athens Convention is that they are grounds which give rise to a break in a period or course of events which is already in train; or
2. the words have a technical meaning derived from certain Civil Law systems;

and on either contention, a suspension or an interruption can only operate if the limitation period has begun to run before the pausing or halting event occurred.

SFC submitted that art 16.3 of the Athens Convention allows the lex fori to extend the two-year limitation by up to one year when the domestic rule operates to pause the running of time in a limitation period which had already commenced but not otherwise. The Scots law of limitation enacted in s 18 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 (the 1973 Act) does not contain such 'grounds of suspension and interruption' as to extend the limitation period. This is because s 18 of the 1973 Act postpones the start of the limitation period instead of interrupting or suspending it as the Athens Convention envisages. Warner's claim as Vincent's guardian was therefore extinguished by the two-year time bar of art 16.1 of the Athens Convention.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

In interpreting an international Convention, national courts must look at the objective meaning of the words used and the purpose of the Convention as a whole (Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251). For the following three reasons, the Supreme Court did not accept that it should give a technical meaning to the words 'suspension and interruption':

1. It was not appropriate to look to the domestic law of Civil Law systems for a technical meaning of the words in an international Convention which was designed to be operated in Common Law systems as well. The word ‘suspension’ in its natural meaning could readily cover the postponement of the start of a limitation period.
2. Even within Civil Law and mixed legal systems which are strongly influenced by the Civil Law there was no uniformity in the use of the expression ‘suspension’ in 1974 when the Athens Convention was adopted. For example, in the French Civil Code the word 'suspension' is used in more than one sense, encompassing both a temporary pause in a prescription period which has already started to run and also the postponement of the start of a prescription period.
3. An interpretation of art 16.3 of the Athens Convention as excluding domestic rules which have the effect of postponing the start of a limitation period would give rise to serious anomalies.

Many legal systems suspend the operation of prescription or limitation when a claimant is a minor or is subject to a recognised legal disability such as mental incapacity. If SFC were correct in its interpretation of 'suspension' in the Athens Convention, the Convention would recognise as a ground of suspension a legal incapacity which arose after the prescription or limitation period commenced but not an incapacity that predated the start of that period. Thus, a minor born before the commencement of the period could not take advantage of the added year which art 16.3 provided, but a minor born after the commencement of the period would benefit from that added year. A similar anomaly would arise depending on the date on which a creditor or claimant was affected by an incapacity such as mental illness.

The words in art 16.3 of the Athens Convention, 'the grounds of suspension of limitation periods' were sufficiently wide to cover domestic rules which postponed the start of a limitation period as well as those which stopped the clock after the limitation period had begun. The suspension of the running of the limitation period imposed by the Athens Convention was subject to the long stop in art 16.3: 'in no case shall an action under this Convention be brought after the expiration of a period of three years from the date when disembarkation should have taken place'. A domestic 'suspension' provision could not defer the expiry of the Athens Convention's limitation period beyond that long stop. In the present case, Mrs Warner’s writ was filed within the 3-year long stop.