This case concerned a claim for damages for bodily injuries, damages, and losses that the plaintiff suffered during a sea voyage in the Gulf of Famagusta. The plaintiff had contracted for a tour with the defendant company. The tour took place on 9 May 2006 on the company's boat, the Shark. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, and that the District Court did not have jurisdiction as the appellant's claim was 'based on an accident at sea and/or during the voyage and/or management of a vessel'. The defendant contended that the competent Court was thus the Supreme Court, not the District Court.

Held: Claim dismissed for lack of admiralty jurisdiction.

The question of the substantive jurisdiction of the Court depends on whether this is a maritime case or not. Section 19(a) of the Courts of Justice Law 1960 (Law 14/60) provides that the Supreme Court is vested with, and exercises the same powers and jurisdiction, as those vested in or exercised by the High Court of Justice in England in its Admiralty jurisdiction on the day immediately preceding the day of independence. According to s 1(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK):

The Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as follows, that is to say, jurisdiction to hear and determine any of the following questions or claims - ...

any claim for loss of life or personal injury sustained in consequence of any defect in a ship or in her apparel or equipment, or of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship or of the master or crew thereof or of any other person for whose wrongful acts, neglects or defaults the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship are responsible, being an act, neglect or default in the navigation or management of the ship, in the loading, carriage or discharge of goods on, in or from the ship or in the embarkation, carriage or disembarkation of persons on, in or from the ship; ...

The basic position of the plaintiff is that this case does not involve a 'ship' in the legal sense.

In Petrou v The Floating Submet (No 1) (1999) 1 (A) AAD 609, 614-616 it was held that:

Our legal definition of the term 'ship' is very broad. 'Ship' includes 'any kind of vessel used in navigation, provided it is not rowing'. The exact same meaning is given to the word 'ship' by s 742 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894: 'Ship includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars.' The phrase 'used in navigation' implies the transport of persons or objects to a intended destination.

The plaintiff's lawyers have misinterpreted the case law and reached a paradoxical result. They claim that the boat in which the plaintiff was carried was not a 'ship' because it was not used in navigation, moving from one place to another, because it started from the Port of Ayia Napa and returned to the same place. Their argument on this was limited. Whether a seagoing vessel is a 'ship' within the meaning of the law has nothing to do with whether it travels substantially in time from one designated place to another, or even if it does. If the logic proposed by the plaintiff was followed, this same boat would be a 'ship' during its voyage from the Port of Ayia Napa to Larnaca Marina, but it would not be a 'ship' at the time it was anchored in the Port of Ayia Napa.

It is the characteristics of the boat that matter, and that it is capable of being used in navigation. After all, in Petrou, the boat in question, which the Supreme Court accepted to be a 'ship', was sailing at the relevant time uncontrollably without any person on board.

The jurisdiction of the Court derives from the law under which it was established. The jurisdiction of the District Courts is determined by ss 21-24 of the Courts of Justice Law 1960. The parties may not give the Court jurisdiction with their consent where it does not have it: see Michaelidou v Gregoriou (1988) 1 CLR 88.

In the claim report, the vessel is described as a cruising passenger vessel and/or flat reef vessel with the name Shark and number LL 9641. Persons made reservations for tour services with the boat. The plaintiff also made a reservation for a tour from the Port of Ayia Napa to Famagusta, then to the area of Nissi Beach, returning to the Port of Ayia Napa. Therefore, the boat was used so that interested persons could be transported for a fee from the Port of Ayia Napa to various places for sightseeing purposes, natural beauty spots, and perhaps other points of interest and leisure in general. At the relevant time, the plaintiff was on the boat, together with her husband, their two children, and the captain. Therefore the boat was of such a size that it could accommodate at least five people. There may have been other passengers as well. It also appears that the boat had wooden seats for the occupants.

The vessel on which the plaintiff was aboard was a 'ship' within the meaning of the law. The plaintiff's claim for bodily harm falls within the provisions of s 1(1)(f) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK), as applicable in Cyprus. The plaintiff's claim therefore falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Courts of Justice Law 1960.

[For the successful appeal, see Bibbs v PP Dolphin Boat Safari Ltd ECLI:CY:AD:2021:A210 (CMI1436).]