After a passenger ferry sinking, the affected claimants initiated legal proceedings against the shipowner, the master, the crew, and the insurer of the shipping company claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage (the first claimant) and for mental suffering (the rest of the claimants).

At the Court of First Instance, the claims were partially accepted against the defendants but rejected as regards the insurer. At the Court of Appeal, the shipowner's appeal was partially accepted and rejected regarding another defendant.

Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: The claimants' and the defendants' appeals are dismissed.

First, the claimants' appeal A against the defendants was reviewed. In this appeal, the claimants referred to the Hague-Visby Rules provisions. The Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the Court of Appeal in the light of arts 1.b, 2, 3.1, 3.6, 5, 10, 10.b, and 10.c of the Hague-Visby Rules, and concluded the following:

Greece ratified the Hague-Visby Rules by art 1 of the Law 2107/1992. They constitute, pursuant to art 28 of the Constitution, an internal rule of law with supra-legislative force. From the combination of the provisions of art 2 of the Law 21071992 and arts 1.b, 2, 3.1, 5, 10.b, and 10.c of the Hague-Visby Rules, it follows that the Hague-Visby Rules apply in Greece to:

a) any contract for the carriage of goods by sea in which the ports of loading and unloading are in different States, provided that such carriage is covered by a bill of lading or other similar document which constitutes the title to the carriage of goods by sea; and

b) any carriage by sea between Greek ports, whether or not a bill of lading has been issued.

This is what the legislator has permissibly done, ie extend the application of the Hague-Visby Rules to inland waterway carriage, in accordance with the discretion provided by art 10.c of the Hague-Visby Rules, as replaced by art 3 of the Visby Protocol 1968.

Moreover, arts 148, 187, and 289 of the Private Maritime Law Code (PMLC, Law 3816/1958) are not applicable because such provisions 'on the carriage of goods' are contained in the Hague-Visby Rules which, as stated above, also govern the inland carriage of goods by sea, whether or not a bill of lading is issued. As a consequence, this Convention, through art 187 of the PMLC, now regulates, among other things, the claims of passengers against the carrier for compensation for loss, damage or delayed delivery of luggage and the limitation period for such claims, in respect of which the above provisions of the PMLC relating to the carriage of goods between Greek ports are thus deemed to have been repealed with effect from the entry into force of the Convention.

Such an interpretation also corresponds to the intention of the Greek legislator, which was to make the Hague-Visby Rules the internal law for all national maritime carriage. Article 3.6 of the Convention, as in force after its amendment by art 1.2 of the Visby Protocol, establishes a short annual limitation period, starting from the date of delivery of the goods or the date on which they should have been delivered. That this is a limitation period and not a period of right extinction is clear from the same provision, which goes on to state that 'this period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action has arisen', but there is no extension of the period of extinction for the exercise of a right which has been extinguished.

This one-year limitation period is established due to the nature of the carrier's activity, who, being occupied with many obligations, which give rise to many disputes, must be able to make its calculations within a reasonable limitation period, applies irrespective of whether the right is based on the maritime contract of carriage or on a tort, in accordance with art 4bis of the Hague-Visby Rules, added by the Visby Protocol.

Furthermore, baggage is understood, within the meaning of the above provisions, as the items packed (in travel bags, suitcases, etc) that accompany passengersand are intended for their personal use. This includes, but is not limited to, items of clothing, accessories, and the like. Finally, given that the PMLC and the Hague-Visby Rules do not contain any reference to the liability of the carrier by sea in respect of money, valuables, and similar precious objects carried by the passenger, the provisions on other luggage also apply in respect of such articles.

Here, the first claimant, claiming that the defendants were liable in tort, sought an order that they should also pay her EUR 3,350 as compensation for the loss, as a result of the shipwreck, of her personal belongings, luggage, and the money she had brought with her. The Court of Appeal accepted the plea of limitation under the Hague-Visby Rules raised by the first defendant. In so holding, the Court of Appeal did not infringe art 187 of the PMLC and the Hague-Visby Rules.

In consequence of the above, the appeal is dismissed.

The Supreme Court then examined Appeal B of the defendant shipowner. The Court reviewed the Court of Appeal's decision by considering arts 1.9, 2.1, 2.1a, 2.1.b, 2.1.c, 3.1, 7.1, 12.1, and 14 of the Athens Convention 1974:

The Athens Convention 1974 was ratified by the Law 1922/1991 and has the force of law as provided in art 28.1 of the Constitution.

This Convention applies only to international maritime carriage as defined in art 1.9, and therefore does not apply if the place of departure and the place of destination, as well as the intermediate ports of call, according to the contract or the scheduled itinerary, are located in the same State. If the legislator wanted the Convention to be extended to inland carriage, it would have expressly provided for this, as it did in the analogous case of the Hague-Visby Rules by art 2.1 of the Law 2107/1992, which ratified that Convention. Not applying the Athens Convention to inland carriage does not infringe the principle of equality established by the provision of art 4.1 of the Constitution. Here, the Athens Convention 1974 regulates international carriage of passengers by sea, which involves different risks from those of inland maritime carriage.

Moreover, the Athens Convention 1974 is intended exclusively to regulate in a uniform manner cases concerning passenger claims for compensation where there is more than one applicable law, as is the case in international carriage, whereas that is not, in principle, the case in inland carriage. They are therefore essentially dissimilar and involve different relationships and situations.

In holding that this case does not concern international carriage, but inland maritime carriage, and therefore the Athens Convention does not apply, the Court did not violate any of the provisions of that Convention, nor did it violate art 4.1 of the Constitution.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.